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FEDERAL DISCOVERY STAYS
Gideon Mark*
In federal civil litigation, unless a discretionary stay is granted, discovery often
proceeds while motions to dismiss are pending. Plaintiffs with non-meritorious
cases can compel defendants to spend massively on electronic discovery before
courts ever rule on such motions. Defendants who are unable or unwilling to
incur the huge up-front expense of electronic discovery may be forced to settle non-
meritorious claims. To address multiple electronic discovery issues, Congress
amended the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 2006 and the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 2008. However the amendments failed to significantly reduce costs
and failed to address the critical issue of discovery timing. This Article contends
that a mandatory stay is the most effective solution to the problem of electronic dis-
covery during the pendency of motions to dismiss. In 1995, the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act imposed a mandatory stay of all discovery while motions to
dismiss are pending in actions alleging violations of securities laws, absent appli-
cation of two limited statutory exceptions. This Article examines the operation of
the mandatory stay in securities actions and concludes that it should be extended
to electronic discovery in all federal civil litigation, unless an exception applies.
Imposition of a mandatory stay of electronic discovery before the disposition of mo-
tions to dismiss is the most equitable and effective solution to the unresolved
problem of coercive settlements.
INTRODUCTION
Electronic discovery (e-discovery) is ubiquitous. It has been sug-
gested that in modern litigation all discovery is electronic' because
99 percent of the world's information is generated electronically'
and only a fraction is converted to paper. E-discovery has become
increasingly complex and expensive3  and, in many cases, it
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Maryland School of Business.
Professor Mark holds degrees from Brandeis, Columbia, Harvard, NYU, and the University
of California.
1. See Megan Jones, Giving Electronic Discovery a Chance to Grow Up, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 14,
2009, at 18 (citing federal districtjudge Shira Scheindlin).
2. See PETER LYMAN & HAL R. VARIAN, SCH. OF INFO. MGMT. AND SYS. AT THE UNIV.
OF CAL. AT BERKELEY, How MUCH INFORMATION? 1 (2003) [hereinafter How MUCH INFOR-
MATION?], available at http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info-
2003/printable-report.pdf (reporting that in 2002, 92 percent of new information was
stored on magnetic media (primarily hard drives), 7 percent on film, and a mere 0.01
percent on paper).
3. Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Securities,
LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The costs of e-discovery often reach three to
four times the low estimate of liability and twice the high estimate of liability in civil cases.
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commences during the pendency of a motion to dismiss. Nothing
in Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), which
governs motions to dismiss, triggers an automatic stay of discovery
before the disposition of such motions. Likewise, no other federal
rule triggers an automatic stay. Parties frequently move for discov-
ery stays pending disposition of Rule 12 motions, but the results
are decidedly mixed. Accordingly, the default situation is that dis-
covery may proceed during the pleading stage of the
approximately 280,000 civil cases that are filed annually in the fed-
eral courts.
A major adverse effect of the burden and expense associated
with e-discovery during the pendency of motions to dismiss, which
typically lasts for months, is that plaintiffs with non-meritorious
cases are able to coerce settlements from defendants who cannot
or choose not to bear such costs.' While "there is also no litmus test
to identify extortionate settlements or measure how frequently
they occur,"8 it is clear that they do happen. One indicium is the
well-documented phenomenon of vanishing civil trials. A mere 1.1
See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL Sys., THE EMERGING CHALLENGE OF
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: STRATEGIES FOR AMERICAN BUSINESS 12 (2008), available at
http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/EDiscovery-Strategies.pdf; see also H.R. 4115: Tig-
gering Soaring E-Discovery Costs, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNSEL, July 2010, at 6 ("E-discovery
is in many cases the most significant cost in litigation. It can easily eat as much as 50 percent
of a company's litigation budget.") (quoting David Lender, Partner, Weil, Gotshal & Manges
LLP); Nathan Koppel, Using Software to Sift Digital Records, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2010, at B6
(noting that at Fortune 1000 companies, spending on e-discovery as a share of litigation
costs increased to 7.1 percent in 2010, up from 5.2 percent in 2006).
4. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12.
5. Slate Rock Constr. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. 2:10-cv-01031, 2011 WL 1641470, at
*4 (S.D. Ohio May 2, 2011).
6. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 144 (2011) [hereinaf-
ter 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/JudicialBusinesspdfversion.pdf (reporting that
282,895 civil cases were filed in U.S. district courts during the 12-month period ending Sep-
tember 30, 2010).
7. A study of almost 8,000 federal district court cases that closed during the period
October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2006 found a mean disposition time of 129.78 days for
Rule 12(b) motions to dismiss, 12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings, and 12(f)
motions to strike. INST. FOR ADVANCEMENT OF AM LEGAL SYS., CIVIL CASE PROCESSING IN
THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A 21ST CENTURY ANALYSIS 48 (2009), available at
http://www.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/PACER%20FINAL%201-21-09.pdf; see also Agile Sky
Alliance Fund LP v. Citizens Fin. Group, No. 09-cv-02786-MSK-BNB, 2010 WL 1816351, at *2
(D. Colo. May 5, 2010) ("Motions to dismiss usually take months to decide."); Edward A.
Hartnett, TamingTwombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 473, 508 n.151 (2010) ("It is
not all that unusual for six months to a year to elapse between the filing of a motion to dis-
miss and the court's decision on that motion.").
8. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 65 (2010).
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percent of federal civil cases proceed to trial.9 This phenomenon
has multiple causes, but the high cost of e-discovery plays a primary
role.o Another indicium is the reported experience of practicing
attorneys. According to a 2009 survey by the American Bar Associa-
tion Section of Litigation, 69.4 percent of approximately 3,300
responding attorneys agreed or strongly agreed that discovery is
commonly used as a tool to force settlement," and 54.3 percent of
respondents agreed or strongly agreed that discovery concerning
the adequacy of e-discovery responses is used as a tool to force set-
tlement.12 Efforts have been made to confront the numerous
problems associated with e-discovery. Congress amended the FRCP
in 2006 and the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) in 2008. Howev-
er, those efforts have not reduced costs significantly and failed to
address the critical issue of discovery timing. Specifically, the
amendments have proven unable to curb the problem of extor-
tionate settlements driven by front-loaded e-discovery costs.
9. See 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, Supra note 6, at 168 (reporting that of
the 309,361 civil cases that were terminated in U.S. district courts during the 12-month peri-
od ending September 30, 2010, only 1.1 percent reached trial); see also Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil
Rights and EmploymentDiscrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 517, 518 (2010) ("Pretrial prac-
tice in federal civil litigation has dramatically changed over the last thirty years .... [T]rials
have vanished.").
10. See David R. Fine, et al., The "Vanishing" Civiljury Trial- (Report of the Middle District
Civil jury Trial Bench/Bar Task Force), 80 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 24, 31 (2009) (linking cost of e-
discovery, among other factors, to vanishing civil trials); Lee H. Rosenthal, A Few Thoughts on
Electronic Discovery After December 1, 2006, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 167, 191 (Nov. 20, 2006)
available at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-jotrnal-pocket-part/procedure/
a-few-thoughts-on-electronic-discovery-after-december-1,-2006/ ("Lawyers and judges are
collectively wringing their hands over the continuing decline in the number of trials, espe-
cially jury trials. The factors that contribute to this are many and varied, but there is a
consensus that the costs and delays of civil litigation-largely due to discovery-play a signif-
icant role."); H.R. 4115: Triggering Soaring E-Discovery Costs, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNSEL,
July 2010, at 6; JOHN H. BEISNER, U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE CENTRE
CANNOT HOLD: THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE REFORM OF THE U.S. CIVIL DISCOVERY PROCESS 2
(2010) [hereinafter EFFECTIVE REFORM], available at http://www.uschamber.com/reports/
centre-cannot-hold-need-effective-reform-us-civil-discovery-process.
11. See AM. BAR Ass'N SECTION OF LITIG., MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: DE-
TAILED REPORT 68 (2009) [hereinafter ABA REPORT], available at http://www.abanet.org/
litigation/survey/docs/report-aba-report.pdf.
12. Id. at 80. A separate survey, published in 2009 by the American College of Trial
Lawyers (ACTL) and the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System,
reached the same result: 71 percent of approximately 1,400 responding Fellows of the ACTL
agreed that discovery is used as a tool to force settlement. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS &
INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL Sys., FINAL REPORT ON THEJOINT PROJECT
OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTI-
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An effective solution to the problem is a mandatory stay of e-
discovery during the pendency of motions to dismiss. Since 1995,
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) has mandat-
ed a stay of all discovery during the pendency of motions to dismiss
in securities litigation, subject to two limited exceptions. " The
available evidence suggests that the PSLRA discovery stay has ac-
complished its two primary objectives: it has reduced the number
of plaintiffs filing securities class actions to force coercive settle-
ments, and it has reduced the number of plaintiffs commencing
securities litigation hoping to uncover a sustainable claim through
discovery. The PSLRA's mandatory stay of discovery should be ex-
tended to e-discovery in all federal civil litigation while motions to
dismiss are pending. Imposition of a mandatory stay is the most
equitable and effective solution to the problems posed by costly e-
discovery.
I. DISCOVERY PROCEEDS WHILE MOTIONS To Dismiss
ARE PENDING IN FEDERAL COURT
Contrary to recent suggestions by some commentatorsl4 and the
United States Supreme Court,"' discovery may proceed while mo-
tions to dismiss are pending in federal litigation, unless the action
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b) (1); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (3) (B) (discovery shall be stayed
during the pendency of any motion to dismiss "unless the court finds upon the motion of
any party that particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue
prejudice to that party.").
14. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access,
94 IoWA L. REv. 873, 933 n.249 (2009) (asserting that judges rarely allow targeted discovery
prior to resolving Rule 12(b)(6) motions); Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn up the Chaff with Un-
quenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us AboutJudicial Power Over Pleadings,
88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1268 (2008) ("[A] pleading sufficiency challenge is designed to be
made before the case advances to the discovery stage."); Schneider, supra note 9, at 545 ("At
pleading, there has been no opportunity for discovery .... With Iqbal, a summary judgment
decision is effectively disguised as a Rule 12(b) (6) motion before any discovery occurs.").
15. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009) ("Because respondent's com-
plaint is deficient under Rule 8, he is not entitled to discovery . . . ."); Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 n.8 (2007) (referring to an "understanding that, before pro-
ceeding to discovery, a complaint must allege facts suggestive of illegal conduct"); see also
Scott Dodson, Federal Pleading and State Presuit Discovery, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 43, 55
(2010) ("The import of Twombly and Iqbal is that only a complaint that can survive a motion
to dismiss entitles a plaintiff to discovery from the defendant or third parties."); Scott Dod-
son, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REv. 53, 69 (2010) (noting that the Court's
statements in Iqbal and Twombly reflect its belief that the filing of a motion to dismiss auto-
matically stays discovery); David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 CEO. L.J. 117, 141
(2010).
16. Some states automatically stay discovery. For example, in New York service of a mo-
tion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment stays discovery until determination of the
motion unless the court orders otherwise. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3214 (CONSOL. 2011). In 2009,
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is governed by the PSLRA's automatic stay of discovery or a discre-
tionary stay has been imposed for good cause under FRCP Rule
26(c). The FRCP have no specific provision about the availability of
discovery during the pendency of a motion to dismiss.17 Rule
26(d) (1) is the only federal rule that specifically addresses discov-
ery timing. It provides that discovery may be taken any time after
the completion of the initial discovery conference mandated by
Rule 26(f). The Rule 26 conference must take place as soon as
practicable and not later than twenty-one days before a scheduling
conference is to be held or a scheduling order is due under Rule
16(b).' 9 In turn, Rule 16(b) requires the issuance of a scheduling
order as soon as practicable, but within the earlier of 120 days after
service of the initial complaint in the action or 90 days after any
defendant has appeared.20 No aspect of this sequence establishes
that a motion to dismiss must be decided, or even filed, before the
completion of the Rule 26(f) discovery conference. Indeed, Rule
12(i) provides that a court may defer resolving a motion to dismiss
until trial.'
The general rule that discovery may proceed while motions to
22dismiss are pending has been underscored by numerous federal
Georgia amended its civil practice rules to provide for an automatic stay of discovery lasting
ninety days from the filing of a motion to dismiss. See Kimberly Hermann & Melissa G. Hod-
son, Civil Practice Reform, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 185, 192-93 (2009).
17. See Thompson v. Children's Hosp., No. 11-cv-00049-WYD-KMT, 2011 WL 2066517,
at *1 (D. Colo. May 25, 2011) ("The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly pro-
vide for a stay of proceedings."); Williams v. New Day Farms, LLC, No. 2:10-cv-0394, 2010
WL 3522397, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 7, 2010) ("'Had the Federal Rules contemplated that a
motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 12(b) (6) would stay discovery, the Rules would con-
tam a provision to that effect.'") (quoting Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 133 F.R.D. 39, 40
(N.D. Cal. 1990)).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d) (1).
19. Id. 26(f).
20. Id.16(b)(2).
21. Id. 12(i). Some local rules provide for automatic stays. See, e.g., 10 W. Chase, LLC v.
Shepard, Bankr. (In re Shepard), No. 09-17489, 2011 WL 1045081, at *10 (Bankr. D. Md.
Mar. 16, 2011) ("Local Rule 7026-1(d) stays discovery pending the resolution of a Rule
12(b) motion.").
22. The general rule has some narrow exceptions. First, the United States Supreme
Court has endorsed the practice of staying discovery pending resolution of the threshold issue
of qualified immunity. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998); Harlow v. Fitzger-
ald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Williams v. Metcalfe, No. C 08-3907 SI (pr), 2010 WL 2640293, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2010) ("The U.S. Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that a dis-
trict court should stay discovery until the threshold question of qualified immunity is settled.").
Cf O'Meara v. Heineman, Nos. 8:09CV00157, 4:10CV3020, 4:10CV3021, 2010 WL 2640299, at
*1 (D. Neb.June 28, 2010) ("Thus, where qualified immunity is asserted as a defense, it is with-
in the discretion of the court to stay discovery until the issue of qualified immunity is
resolved."). Second, discovery might be stayed pending resolution of a challenge to plaintifFs
standing. See United States Catholic Conf. v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72,
409
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courts. For example, the Seventh Circuit stated: "Discovery need
not cease during the pendency of a motion to dismiss."23 A number
of courts24 and scholars2 5 are in accord. In addition, the fact that
Congress specifically included a mandatory stay provision in the
PSLRA strongly undercuts the notion that the FRCP provide for a
mandatory stay in all civil litigation.
While there is no automatic stay of discovery in federal actions
not governed by the PSLRA, FRCP Rule 26(c) authorizes the impo-
27sition of discretionary stays, subject to a showing of good cause.
79-80 (1988); Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2010 AL 4867346, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
17, 2010).
23. SK Tool Hand Tool Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 852 F.2d 936, 945 n.11 (7th Cir.
1988).
24. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Levy, No. CV-10-1652 (FB) (VVP), 2011 WL 288511, at
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2011) ("The pendency of the motion to dismiss does not provide an
automatic basis to stay discovery."); Tamburo, 2010 WIL 4867346, at *2 ("Twombly and 1qbaldo
not dictate that a motion to stay should be granted every time a motion to dismiss is placed
before the Court."); Integ. Systems & Power, Inc. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., No. 09 CV
5874(RPP), 2009 H4L 2777076, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2009); DSM Desotech Inc. v. 3D Sys-
tems Corp., No. 08 CV 1531, 2008 WL 4812440, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2008); Bocciolone v.
Solowsky, No. 08-20200-CIV, 2008 WL 2906719, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2008). In Chudasama
v. Mazda Motor Corp., the Eleventh Circuit made certain statements that have sometimes
been misinterpreted to recognize a virtually automatic stay of discovery. 123 F.3d 1353, 1368
(11th Cir. 1997). See, e.g., Solar Star Systems, LLC v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., No. 10-
21105-CIV, 2011 '4L 1226119, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2011) (citing Chudasama for the
proposition that "[p]otentially dispositive motions filed prior to discovery weigh heavily in
favor of issuing a stay"). The misinterpretation was noted in Koock v. Sugar & Felsenthal, LLP,
No. 8:09-CV-609-T-17EAJ, 2009 WL 2579307, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 2009) ("The holding
in Chudasama does not establish the general rule that discovery should not proceed while a
motion to dismiss is pending .... Instead, Chudasama and its progeny 'stand for the much
narrower proposition that courts should not delay ruling on a likely meritorious motion to
dismiss while undue discovery costs mount.'"); accord In re Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. ERISA
Litig., No. 3:04-cv-194-J-33MCR, 2007 WIL 1877887, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 28, 2007); see also
Lori Andrus, In the Wake ofIqbal, 46 TRIAL 20, 29 (2010) (noting "the many federal decisions
rejecting the pendency of a motion to dismiss as a basis for granting a blanket discovery
stay").
25. See Hartnett, supra note 7, at 507 ("While the opinions in Twombly, as well as most
commentators, seem to assume that surviving a 12(b) (6) motion is a prerequisite to discov-
ery, this is simply not the case. The mere filing of a motion to dismiss does not trigger a stay
of discovery."); Miller, supra note 8, at 109.
26. See Brooks v. Macy's, Inc., No. 10 CIV 5304 BSJ HBP, 2010 NA1 5297756, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2010).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) provides that "[tihe court may, for good cause, issue an
order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense, including ... specifying terms, including time and place, for the disclo-
sure or discovery[.]". See also FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee's note to 1970
Amendment ("[C]ourts have ample power under Rule 26(c) to protect respondent against
undue burden or expense, either by restricting discovery or requiring that the discovering
party pay costs."). Apart from their power under Rule 26(c), federal district courts may issue
stays pursuant to their inherent authority to manage cases before them. See Clinton v. Jones,
520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997) ("The District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an
incident to its power to control its own docket."); Shaw v. Allred, No. 10-cv-00156-MSK-MEH,
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Good cause is not defined in that rule or in the accompanying Ad-
visory Committee's Notes. However, federal courts frequently
remark that Rule 26(c) discovery stays are disfavored.28 Consistent
with this prevailing view, courts strictly apply the good cause re-
quirement.29
The mere filing of a case-dispositive motion, or the intent to file
such a motion, does not constitute good cause.o Some courts have
asserted that there are "universally recognized"3' factors for evaluat-
ing good cause, but this is dubious. To determine good cause in
connection with Rule 26(c), federal district courts have devised at
least thirteen similar, but non-identical, multifactor tests. The
number of factors identified in the various tests ranges from two to
six. While most of the tests focus on the prejudice to the party op-
posing the stay and the burden on the party resisting discovery, this
1 2focus is not universal.
2010 WL 2757357, at *1 (D. Colo. July 12, 2010); Power v. Williams, No. 3:09-cv-594-J-20HTS,
2010 WL 431921, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2010).
28. See, e.g., Owens v. Donahoe, No. 10-cv-01886-WJM-KMT, 2011 WL 2014777, at *1
(D. Colo. May 23, 2011); Geiser v. Simplicity, Inc., No. 5:10-CV-21, 2011 WL 128776, at *3
(N.D. W. Va. Jan. 14, 2011); Smith v. Waverly Partners, LLC, No. 3:10CV28-RLV-DSC, 2010
WL 3943933, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 6, 2010); Coss v. Playtex Products, LLC, No. 08 C 50222,
2009 WL 1455358, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2009).
29. See, e.g., Buckwalter v. Nevada Bd. of Med. Examiners, No. 2:10-cv-02034-KJD-GWF,
2011 AI 841391, at *1 (D. Nev. Mar. 7, 2011) ("A party carries a heavy burden of making a
'strong showing' why discovery should be stayed."); Stone v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 08-
cv-02522-REB-KMT, 2009 WL 267688, at *1 (D. Colo. Feb. 2, 2009) (quoting Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Chilcott Portfolio Mgmt., Inc., 713 F.2d 1377, 1484 (10th Cir.
1983)). But see Sanders v. City of Indianapolis, No. 1:09-cv-0622-SEB-JMS, 2010 WL 1410587,
at *1 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 2, 2010) ("Although not mandatory, courts often stay discovery while a
motion to dismiss the complaint is pleading."); In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 231 F.R.D.
331, 336 (N.D. Ill. 2005) ("Numerous cases in this circuit have allowed stays in the face of a
Rule 12(b) (6) challenge."); Jonathan M.Jacobson & Joyce Choi, Curtailing the Impact of Class
Actions on Antitrust Policy, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 549, 559 (2011) (asserting that most
courts typically stay all discovery pending resolution of motions to dismiss in antitrust litiga-
tion).
30. Coyle v. Hornell Brewing Co., No. 08-2797 (JBS/JS), 2009 WL 1652399, at *3
(D.N.J. June 9, 2009); Gerald Chamales Corp. v. Oki Data Americas, Inc., 247 F.R.D. 453,
454 (D.N.J. 2007). State law is often in accord. See, e.g., Orloff v. Shulman, 2005 WL 333240,
at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 2, 2005) (noting that under Delaware law, there is no right to stay of
discovery where a dispositive motion has been filed).
31. See, e.g., Hall v. Town of Gilchrist, No. 11-cv-00327-REB-BNB, 2011 WL 1518667, at
*1 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2011).
32. The first version considers "the pendency of dispositive motions, potential preju-
dice to the party opposing the stay, the breadth of discovery sought, and the burden that
would be imposed on the parties responding to the proposed discovery." Anthracite Capital
BOFA Funding, LLC v. Knutson, No. 09 Civ. 1603(LTS) (KNF), 2009 WIL 4496050, at *2
(S.D.N.Y Dec. 3, 2009) (citation omitted); Steuben Foods, Inc. v. Country Gourmet Foods,
LLC, No. 08-CV-561S(F), 2009 WL 3191464, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009) (citation omit-
ted); Ellington Credit Fund, Ltd. v. Select Portfolio Servs., Inc., No. 08 Civ. 2437(RJS), 2009
WL 274483, at *1 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 3, 2009). A second version weighs the "balance [of] the
harm produced by a delay in discovery against the possibility that the motion will be granted
WINTER 2012] 411
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and eliminate the need for such discovery." Gordon v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc.,
No. CV410-228, 2010 WL 5463165, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 29, 2010); see also Berry v. Canady,
No. 2:09-cv-765-FtM-29SPC, 2011 WL 806230, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2011); Yerk v. People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, No. 2:09-cv-537-FtM-29SPC, 2010 1I 1730754, at *1
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 2010). A third version tracks the language of Rule 26(c) and specifies
that good cause may exist when the party from whom discovery is sought would suffer an-
noyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. Tostado v. Citibank
(South Dakota), N.A., SA-09-CV-549-XR, 2009 WL 4774771, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2009).
A fourth version provides that a court must consider "whether the movant is likely to prevail
in the underlying proceeding; whether, absent a stay, any party will stiffer substantial or
irreparable harm; and, the public interests at stake." Stone v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No.
08-cv-02522-REB-KMT, 2009 WL 267688, at *1 (D. Colo. Feb. 2, 2009). A fifth version pro-
vides that good cause may exist if a "dispositive motion has been filed that could resolve the
case and a stay does not unduly prejudice the opposing party." Parker v. Stryker Corp., No.
08-cv-01093-REB-MEH, 2008 WL 4457864, at *1 (D. Colo. Oct. 1, 2008). A sixth version
considers whether the defendant has made a strong showing that the plaintiffs claim is
unmeritorious, the breadth of discovery and the burden of responding to it, the risk of un-
fair prejudice to the party opposing the stay, the nature and complexity of the action, and
whether some or all of the defendants have joined in the stay request. Morien v. Munich
Reins. America, Inc., 270 F.R.D. 65, 67 (D. Conn. 2010); Rivera v. Inc. Village of Farming-
dale, No. CV 06-2613(DRH)(ARL), 2007 WI 3047089, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2007). A
seventh version examines "(1) the plaintiffs interests in proceeding expeditiously with the
civil action and the potential prejudice to plaintiff of a delay; (2) the burden on defendants;
(3) the convenience to the court; (4) the interest of persons not parties to the civil litiga-
tion; and (5) the public interest." Owens v. Donahoe, No. 10-cv-01886-WJM-KMT, 2011 WIL
2014777, at *1 (D. Colo. May 23, 2011); Meadows at Buena Vista, Inc. v. Town of Buena
Vista, No. 10-cv-02871-MSK-KMT, 2011 WL 403344, at *1 (D. Colo. Feb. 3, 2011); Samson
Res. Co. v.J. Aron & Co., No. 08-CV-752-TCK-SAJ, 2009 WL 1606564, at *1 (N.D. Okla. June
8, 2009). An eighth version considers the "type of motion and whether it is a challenge as a
'matter of law"' or to the "'sufficiency' of the allegations; the nature and complexity of the
action; whether counterclaims and/or cross-claims have been interposed; whether some or
all of the defendants" joined in the stay request; the litigation's procedural posture or stage;
the "expected extent of discovery in light of the number of parties and complexity of the
issues in the case; and any other relevant circumstances." Buckwalter v. Nevada Bd. of Med.
Examiners, No. 2:10-cv-02034-KJD-GWF, 2011 WIL 841391, at *1 (D. Nev. Mar. 7, 2011);
Bragg v. United States, No. 2:10-0683, 2010 1 3835080, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 29, 2010);
Hachette Distrib., Inc. v. Hudson Cnty. News Co., Inc., 136 F.R.D. 356, 358 (E.D.N.Y 1991).
A ninth version provides for a stay "where the case is likely to be finally concluded as a result
of the ruling thereon; where the facts sought through uncompleted discovery would not
affect the resolution of the motion; or where discovery on all issues of the broad complaint
would be wasteful and burdensome." Woods v. Wyandotte Cnty. Dist. Att'y., No. 10-2362-JTM-
DJW, 2010 HT 4361912, at *1 (D. Kan. Oct. 28, 2010); Wolf v. United States, 157 F.R.D. 494,
495 (D. Kan. 1994). A tenth version provides that good cause is shown "where a party has
filed a dispositive motion, the stay is for a short period of time, and the opposing party will
not be prejudiced." Dowdy & Dowdy P'ship v. Arbitron Inc., No. 2:09cv253 KS-MTP, 2010
WL 3893915, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 30, 2010) (citation omitted). An eleventh version con-
siders the "potential for the dispositive motion to terminate all the claims in the case or all
the claims against particular defendants, strong support for the dispositive motion on the
merits, and irrelevancy of the discovery at issue to the dispositive motion." Somie v. GEO
Grp., Inc., No. 5:09-CT-3142-FL, 2011 WL 1831695, at *1 (E.D.N.C. May 12, 2011) (citation
omitted). A twelfth version considers the "breadth of discovery sought and the burden of
responding to it, as well as the strength of the underlying motion." Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Kyocera Corp., No. 10-CV-6334-CJS, 2011 WL 1432038, at *1 n.1 (W.D.N.Y Apr. 14, 2011);
Integrated Sys. & Power, Inc. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., No. 09 CV 5874(RPP), 2009 W
2777076, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2009); Spencer Trask Software & Information Servs., LLC v.
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The discretionary use of numerous conflicting tests for "good
cause" is both common and largely unreviewable. Neither the
grant nor the denial of a motion for stay of discovery pending reso-
lution of a motion to dismiss is an appealable order of the district
court. In general, federal discovery orders are not immediately ap-
pealable because they do not end litigation on the merits.3 3 If
discovery is stayed, and then an action is dismissed without leave to
amend pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6), the dismissal and stay is review-
able. However, the standard of review is abuse of discretion.
Moreover, on review, it is unlikely that an appellate court would
find that a stay of discovery constituted reversible error.3 If discov-
ery is not stayed, and then a motion to dismiss is denied, there is
no appealable order. If the matter proceeds to trial and the de-
fendant wins, any errors in denying the stay and denying the
motion to dismiss are unreviewable. If the defendant loses at trial,
any error resulting from denying the stay will be harmless.
In short, in federal civil litigation that does not fall within the
PSLRA's ambit, there is no mandatory stay of discovery pending
determination of a motion to dismiss. A discretionary stay under
Rule 26(c) provides defendants potential relief, but such stays are
disfavored and subject to an undefined good cause requirement
that has yielded at least thirteen different and sometimes
overlapping tests. In addition, the denial of a stay is essentially un-
reviewable.
II. THE BURDEN AND COST OF E-DISCOVERY
A decade ago, discovery accounted for approximately half the
cost of civil litigation. In complex litigation, the share increased to
RPost Int'l Ltd., 206 F.R.D. 367, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). A thirteenth version weighs the "bur-
den of proceeding with discovery upon the party from whom discovery is sought against the
hardship which would be worked by a denial of discovery and to take into account any socie-
tal interests which are implicated by either proceeding or postponing discovery." Tarazi v.
Oshry, No. 2:10-cv-793, 2011 WL 1437052, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 12, 2011).
33. Am. Bank v. City of Menasha, 627 F.R.D. 261, 264 (7th Cir. 2010) ("[D]iscovery
orders, being interlocutory, generally are not appealable in the federal court systemY[");
Hernandez v. Tanninen, 604 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 2010).
34. See Sapp v. Mem. Hermann Healthcare Sys., No. 10-20340, 2010 WL 5395679, at *3
(5th Cir. Dec. 29, 2010) ("We review a decision to stay discovery pending a dispositive mo-
tion for abuse of discretion."); Mann v. Brenner, 375 F. App'x 232, 239-40 (3d Cir. 2010).
35. Hartnett, supra note 7, at 513.
36. Id. at 514.
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90 percent in cases where discovery was actively conducted. There
is conflicting evidence on the issue of whether this share has de-
clined significantly in the last decade, but it is clear that costs
remain high." E-discovery accounts for much of this cost.3 For ex-
ample, a substantial percentage of e-discovery costs is attributable
to the sheer volume of electronically stored information (ESI). ESI
40comes in a variety of forms and is stored on an ever-expanding
range of devices and platforms.41 Even a simple dispute can involve
37. Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to
Hon. AnthonyJ. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 11, 1999),
192 F.R.D. 340, 357 (2000).
38. See ABA REPORT, supra note 11, at 98 (reporting mean response of 3,300 surveyed
attorneys that 65.6 percent of costs associated with cases that do not go to trial and are not
dismissed on an initial 12(b)(6) motion are incurred in discovery); NAVIGANT CONSULTING,
THE STATE OF DISCOVERY ABUSE IN CIVIL LITIGATION: A SURVEY OF CHIEF LEGAL OFFICERS
8 (2008) [hereinafter STATE OF DISCOVERY ABUSE], available at http://www.law.
northwestem.edu/jep/symposia/documents/2008_CJSMaterials/5bKellyeDiscovery.ppt
(surveying Fortune 1000 chief legal officers to show that, on average in 2007, 45-50 percent
of corporations' civil litigation costs related to discovery activities); EMERY G. LEE III &
THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NAT'L, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRE-
LIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUD. CONF. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES 38-40 (2009),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurvl.pdf/$file/dissurvl.pdf
(reporting that lawyers who primarily represent defendants estimate that discovery accounts
for 27 percent of total litigation costs, whereas lawyers who primarily represent plaintiffs
estimate that discovery accounts for 20 percent of total litigation costs).
39. See ABA REPORT, supra note 11, at 105 (reporting that 76.5 percent of 3,300 sur-
veyed attorneys agree or strongly agree that discovery costs, as a share of total litigation costs,
have increased disproportionately due to the advent of e-discovery); STATE OF DISCOVERY
ABUSE, supra note 38, at 8 (surveying Fortune 1000 chief legal officers to find that discovery
of ESI accounts for, on average, 33-39 percent of total discovery costs).
40. There is no precise definition of ESI. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a) advisory committee's
notes to 2006 Amendments (2011) ("The wide variety of computer systems currently in use,
and the rapidity of technological change, counsel against a limiting or precise definition of
[ESI]."). But ESI is commonly understood to include at least e-mail and attachments; word
processing files; spreadsheets; presentation documents (such as PowerPoint and Corel);
graphics; animations; images; audio, video, and audiovisual recordings; and voicemail. See
A.B.A. CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARD § 29(a) (i) (2004), available at http://riaej.com/portal/
index.php?option=com docman&task=doc-view&gid=257&tmpl=component&format=raw&
Itemid=38. Multinational corporations commonly have 2,000 or more such applications,
"each with varying functionality bearing on the preservation, collection, analysis, review, and
production of ESI." Daniel M. Kolkey & Chuck Ragan, Reevaluating the Rules for e-Discovery,




41. These devices and platforms include databases; networks; computer systems
(hardware and software); servers; archives; backup systems; tapes, magnetic and optical discs
(including DVDs and CDs), drives (including thumb or flash), cartridges, and other storage
media; desktops and laptops; Internet data; personal digital assistants (PDAs); handheld
wireless devices (such as a BlackBerry); firewalls; mobile telephones; paging devices; and
audio systems, including voicemail. See A.B.A. CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS § 29(a) (ii)
(2004), available at http://riaej.com/portal/index.php?option=com-doman&task=doc-
view&gid=257&tmpl=component&format-raw&Itemid=38. Litigants often view data on
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millions of electronic documents.4 2 The volume of potentially dis-
coverable ESI is much higher than traditional paper document
productions, in part because of the substantial quantity of e-mails
and instant messages (IMs) that define daily communication. Ap-
proximately 100 billion e-mails4 and 12 billion IMs" are sent daily.
The average employee sends and receives more than 135 e-mails
each day." Large corporations like Microsoft receive 300-400 mil-
lion internal and external e-mails each month. Moreover, by some
measures, social networks already rival e-mails in importance. In
2009, time spent on social networks (Twitter, Linkedln, Facebook,
MySpace, and others) surpassed time spent on e-mail. By 2014,
the number of consumer and business social networking accounts
worldwide is projected to reach 3.7 billion, virtually equal to the
3.8 billion worldwide e-mail accounts." An estimated 25 billion
"outlier" devices and platforms such as cellular telephones, PDAs, voicemail and IM systems,
chat rooms, and websites as duplicative or insignificant. Edward H. Rippey & Skye L. Perry-
man, Court Imposes Sanctions for Wiping BlackBerrys, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 14, 2009, at 17. But this
perception can have serious adverse litigation consequences, because federal courts increas-
ingly have recognized a duty to preserve and produce outlier ESI even as they continue to
disagree about the level of culpability necessary for an adverse inference jury instruction. See,
e.g., Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 615 (S.D. Tex. 2010)
(noting circuit differences); Vagenos v. LDG Fin. Servs. LLC, No. 09-cv-2672(BMC), 2009
WL 5219021, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2009) (ordering adverse inference instruction for
failure to preserve relevant voicemail recording on cellular telephone); Se. Mech. Servs.,
Inc. v. Brody, Case No. 8:08-CV-1151-T-30EAJ, 657 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (order-
ing adverse inference instruction for destruction of e-mails, calendar entries, and text
messages stored on BlackBerries); see also Rachel K Alexander, E-Discovery Practice, Theory,
and Precedent: Finding the Right Pond, Lure, and Lines Without Going on a Fishing Expedition, 56
S.D. L. REV. 25, 82 (2011) (noting increasing frequency of adverse jury instructions in fed-
eral e-discovery spoliation cases); Farrah Pepper, Honey, I Forgot the Cell Phone: The 411
on 'Outlier' ESI, LAw.com (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.1aw.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/
PubArticleLTNjsp?id=1202439544884 (noting express or implied duty to preserve and pro-
duce outlier ESI in cases involving website, IM or chat room conversations, voicemail
systems, cellular telephones, and PDAs).
42. Patrick L. Oot, The Protective Order Toolkit: Protecting Privilege with Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 502, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 237 n.5 (2009); accord Jason R. Baron, Law in the Age of
Exabytes: Some Further Thoughts on 'Information Inflation' and Current Issues in E-Discovery Search,
17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, at 16 (2011) (noting "the increasing frequency of gigabytes and
terabytes of data in litigated matters.").
43. George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System Adapt?,
13 RICH.J.L. & TECH. 10, at 12 (2007).
44. Gene J. Koprowski, Instant Messaging Grew by Nearly 20 Percent in 2005, TECH-
NEWSWORLD (Nov. 10, 2005, 9:00 AM), http://www.technewsworld.com/story/47270.html.
45. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE Am. LEGAL SYs., ELECTRONIC DisCOVERY: A
VIEW FROM THE FRONTLINES, 5 (2008) [hereinafter VIEW FROM THE FRONTLINES], available
at http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/EDiscovery-FrontLines.pdf.
46. Rachel Hytken, Comment, Electronic Discovery: To What Extent Do the 2006 Amend-
ments Satisfy Their Purposes?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 875, 879 (2008).
47. Teddy Wayne, Social Networks Eclipse E-mail, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2009, at B3.
48. See THE RADICATI GRP., INC., EMAIL STATISTICS REPORT, 2010 at 2-3 (Sara Radi-
cati ed., 2010), available at http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/
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tweets were sent on Twitter in 2010,49 and 4 billion Facebook
messages are sent each day.o While courts are just beginning to
grapple with the discoverability of social network activity, a few
courts already have held that such activity can be discoverable
ESI."
Overall, between 2005 and 2007, the average amount of data
stored by a Fortune 1000 corporation grew from 190 terabytes
(TBs)"2 to 1,000 TBs.5" In the same period, the average size of data
sets at 9,000 U.S. midsize companies increased from two to one
hundred TBs." In 2000, about 70 percent of corporate records
were stored in electronic format,55 and by 2008, this share in-
creased to an estimated 90 percent.56 Because this information is
Email-Statistics-Report-2010-2014-Executive-Summary2.pdf. The number of IM accounts is
projected to reach 3.5 billion in 2014. Id. The respective numbers of social network, e-mail,
and IM accounts in 2010 were 2.2 billion, 2.9 billion, and 2.4 billion. Id.
49. Internet 2010 in Numbers, ROYAL PINGDOM BLOG (Jan. 12, 2011), http://royal.
pingdom.com/2011/01/12/internet-2010-in-numbers/.
50. Brenna Ehrlich, Facebook Messages by the Numbers, MASHABLE.COM (Nov. 15, 2010),
http://mashable.com/2010/11/15/facebook-messages-numbers/.
51. See Steven C. Bennett, Look Who's Talking-Legal Implications of Twitter Social Network-
ing Technology, 81 N.Y. ST. B.A.J. 10 (2009) (noting disagreement as to whether Twitter
messages are "stored" within the meaning of the FRCP); Kathrine Minotti, Comment, The
Advent of Digital Diaries: Implications of Social Networking Websites for the Legal Profession, 60 S.C.
L. REV. 1057, 1062-63 (2009) (arguing that courts should treat social networking infor-
mation as ESI); Andrew C. Payne, Note, Twitigation: Old Rules in a New World, 49 WASHBURN
L.J. 841 (2010) (arguing that courts should hesitate to analogize social networking infor-
mation to traditional ESI); H. Christopher Boehning & Daniel J. Toal, Social Networking Data
Presents New Challenges, N.Y.LJ.,June 30, 2009, at 5.
52. A TB is a measure of computer storage capacity equal to 1,000 gigabytes (GB).
One GB of data is equal to one billion bytes (10' bytes), so one TB of data equals one trillion
(10") bytes. A petabyte is 1000 terabytes and an exabyte (EB) is one million terabytes. It has
been estimated that the total volume of information generated worldwide in 1999 was two
EB, by 2011 the world will create, capture, or replicate nearly 1,800 EB of information, and
by 2020 the amount of digital information created and replicated in the world will grow to
35 trillion GB, or 44 times as much digital information as existed in 2009. How MUCH IN-
FORMATION?, supra note 2, at 3-4; JOHN GANTZ & DAVID REINSEL, THE DIGITAL UNIVERSE
DECADE-ARE YOU READY? 1 (2010), available at http://www.ifap.ru/pr/2010/
n100507a.pdf; JOHN F. GANTZ ET AL., THE DIVERSE AND EXPLODING DIGITAL UNIVERSE: AN
UPDATED FORECAST OF WORLDWIDE INFORMATION GROWTH THROUGH 2011 3 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/diverse-exploding-digital-universe.pdf.
53. Lucas Mearian, A Zettabyte by 2010: Corporate Data Grows Fiftyfold in Three Years, COM-
PUTERWORLD (Mar. 6, 2007, 12:00 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9012364/
Azettabyte_by_2010 Corporate data growsfiftyfold inhreeyears.
54. Id.
55. Lori Enos, Digital Data Changing Legal Landscape, E-COMMERCE TIMES (May 16,
2000, 12:00 AM), http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/3339.html.
56. See Lynne Marek, Law Firms Begin to Hire 'E-Discovery Counsel', NAT'L L.J., Oct. 13,
2008, at 10.
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potentially discoverable, resources associated with its preservation
are a separate and often significant cost in the e-discovery process.5
ESI discovery is also significantly more complex than discovery
of paper documents." Many corporations, if not most, fail to store
and organize their ESI in ways that facilitate efficient collection
and review.59 ESI is usually saved on backup tapes to guard against
catastrophic computer failure. Backup tape characteristics-
including large storage capacities, rapid transfer rates, and low
power consumption-make tapes an ideal backup solution. How-
ever, they have other characteristics that render them less useful
for e-discovery. For example, tapes contain vast amounts of dupli-
cative data6 0 and are frequently unlabeled and disorganized,
rendering the search for information difficult and time-consuming.6 1
Data on a tape are not organized for efficient retrieval of individual
documents or files because the data are generally recorded and
stored sequentially. To locate and access a specific document or
file, all data preceding the target must be read first.6 2 Moreover,
much of the information stored on backup tapes is compressed,
difficult to recover, and must be specially processed before it is us-
able. Tapes are typically restored to hard drives and reformatted
so they can be searched for responsive information. The estimat-
ed cost of restoration varies considerably, but is usually at least
57. See Michael B. de Leeuw & Eric A. Hirsch, E-Discovery's Oft-Overlooked Price Driver-
Preservation Needs to Be Part of Any Cost-ShiftingDialogue, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 15, 2010, at S4.
58. EFFECTIVE REFORM, supra note 10, at 12. E-discovery vendors, who are frequently
hired to collect and process ESI in mid- to large-size cases, have adopted a variety of pricing
models, including per page, per GB, per hour, or per custodian. In recent years, the most
common model has shifted from per page to per GB, reacting to the wildly inaccurate page
count estimates often associated with processing ESI. Seejeffrey S. Jacobson, How to Spend Less
on Electronic Discovery, N.Y.L.J., June 10, 2010, at 7; Jason Krause, Confusion Carries the Day in E-
Discovery, LAW. TECH. NEWS (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/
PubArticleFriendlyLTNjsp?id=1202446546213. Some vendors use a tiered pricing model,
charging one rate per GB to process ESI and a different rate per GB to host data following
de-duplication, filtering, and searching. Marla S.IL Bergman & Steven C. Bennett, Managing
E-Discovery Costs: Mission Possible, 20 PRAc. LITIGATOR, no. 4, July 2009, at 57, 59, available at
http://files.ali-aba.org/thumbs/datastorage/lacidoirep/articles/PLITO907-Bergman-Bennett
thumb.pdf
59. VIEW FROM THE FRONTLINES, supra note 45, at 19, 26.
60. GrantJ. Esposito & Thomas M. Mueller, Backup Tapes, You Can't Live with Them and
You Can't Toss Them: Strategies for Dealing with the Litigation Burdens Associated with Backup Tapes
Under the Amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13, at *7 (2007).
61. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYs. AT U. DENV., THE EMERGING
CHALLENGE OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: STRATEGIES FOR AMERICAN BUSINEss 3 (2008)
[hereinafter EMERGING CHALLENGE], available at http://Nyw.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/
EDiscovery-Strategies.pdf.
62. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
63. EMERGING CHALLENGE, supra note 61, at 3.
64. See Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 314 (noting that UBS backed-up its c-mails on backup
tapes and optical disks).
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$1,000 per tape.65 According to one estimate, the cost of collect-
ing, processing, reviewing, culling, and producing one GB of data
is between $5,000 and $7,000, assuming precise keyword searches
have been employed." If a typical mid-size case produces 500 GB
of data, the production cost could be as high as $2.5 to $3.5
million.67 Improvements in technology68 and increased market
65. See, e.g., Toussie v. County of Suffolk, No. CV 01-6716(JS) (ARL), 2007 WL 4565160,
at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2007) (estimated cost to restore 417 tapes was $418,000 to $963,500,
or approximately $1,000 to $2,300 per tape); Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 313-14 (defendant's
estimated cost to restore 94 tapes was $300,000, or almost $3,200 per tape); Murphy Oil USA,
Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 52 Fed. R. Serv. 168 (E.D. La. 2002) (estimated cost to restore 93
tapes was $6.2 million, or almost $67,000 per tape); Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency,
Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (estimated cost to restore 200 tapes was approximate-
ly $9.75 million, or more than $45,000 per tape). Cf Behzad Behtash, E-Discovery: How to Avoid
Death by Backup, INFORMATIONWEEK (Apr. 17, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.informationweek.
com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=224400402 (estimating that restoration of backup
tapes typically costs $500-$1,000 per tape).
66. VIEW FROM THE FRONTLINES, supra note 45, at 5. But cf Cynthia Cotts, U.S. Compa-
nies' Electronic-Discovery Spending Tripled in 2009, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 20, 2009 12:01 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a-qDYdAZA7o ("The price
for processing electronic data is all over the map, from $400 to $4,000 per gigabyte[.]").
67. VIEW FROM THE FRONTLINES, supra note 45, at 5, 25. A survey of Fortune 200 com-
panies found that, for the period 2006-08, the average company paid average discovery costs
per case of $681,880 to $2,993,567. Companies at the high end during the same period
reported average per case discovery costs ranging from $2,354,868 to $9,759,900. See State-
ment of Civil Justice Reform Grp., Lawyers for Civil Justice and U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal
Reform to Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conf. of the United
States, Litigation Cost Survey of Major Companies 3 (May 10-11, 2010), available at http://
civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/33A2682A2D4EF70
0852577190060E4B5/$File/Litigation%2Cost%2Survey%20of%2OMajor%20Companies.
pdfPOpenElement. A significant percentage of these costs can be attributed to ESI.
68. See Megan Jones, Giving Electronic Discovery a Chance to Grow Up, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 14,
2009, at 18 (reporting that between 2001 and 2009, the average price charged by e-discovery
vendors to process, search, and export to a tool for review one GB of data declined from
$2,000 to less than $400). The increasing use of more efficient cloud-based platforms for
processing and hosting also has contributed to the per-unit price decline. George Socha &
Tom Gelbmann, Climbing Back, LAw TECH. NEWS (Aug. 1, 2010), http://www.law.com/
jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleFriendlyLTNjsp?id=1202463900292. Clouds are third-
party services that host computing workloads in data centers. Global spending on cloud
services reached an estimated $68 billion in 2010, and was predicted to reach $95 billion by
2014. David McCann, Be Clear About the Cloud, CFO.com (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.
cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/14540108; Robert W. Pass & Rebecca N. Shwayri, When Cloud
Computing Meets E-Discovery Obligations, LAw360 (Sept. 14, 2010), http://www.law360.
com/articles/184339/print?section=ip. The basic cloud pricing model is a flat fee based on
capacity consumption. David McCann, Six Costly Cloud Mistakes, CFO.coM (Aug. 12, 2010),
http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/14516478. It has been estimated that, over a 13-
year life cycle, the total cost of implementing and sustaining a cloud environment may be as
much as two thirds lower than maintaining a traditional, non-virtualized information tech-
nology data center. See TED ALFORD & GWEN MORTON, Booz, ALLEN & HAMILTON, THE
ECONOMICS OF CLOUD COMPUTING 1 (2010), available at http://www.boozallen.com/
media/file/Economics-of-Cloud-Computing.pdf. Cloud computing services, including
e-mail, contain their own form of ESI, which may be discoverable. See Steven C. Bennett,
E-Discovery Meets the Cloud, 83 N.Y. ST. B.J. 45 (2011) (noting that discoverability may depend
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competition69 have reduced the per-GB processing cost in recent
years, but those savings have been more than offset by the expo-
nential increase in ESI volume.o
The cumulative effect of the foregoing factors is that the non-
attorney e-discovery market increased from $1.5 billion in 2006 to
$2.8 billion in 2009," and was expected to increase another 10-15
percent in both 2010 and 2011.72 This estimate excludes costs as-
sociated with the attorney review of these documents for
responsiveness and privilege, which can account for 75-90 per-
cent of the increase in total cost of ESI production.7 ' Document
review is regularly performed manually, whether the information
is paper or electronic, so that responsive and privileged materials
on whether the user has a legal obligation to maintain cloud-stored records); Fernando M.
Pinguelo & Bradford W. Muller, Avoid the Rainy Day: Survey of U.S. Cloud Computing Caselaw, B.C.
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F., at *7 (2011) ("It is increasingly difficult for parties to hide behind
their remote storage providers when fielding e-discovery requests, as courts find those servers
to be within the party's 'possession, custody or control."'); Fernando A. BohorquezJr. & Alber-
to Rodriguez, How to Keep the 'Cloud'from Bursting in Litigation, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 20, 2010, at 13
(identifying five different types of cloud services that may contain ESI).
69. Litigation can be counter-cyclical, with the result that a number of e-discovery ven-
dors entered the market during the recession of 2007-09. See DEBRA LOGAN, ET AL.,
GARTNER RAS CORE RESEARCH NOTE G00171281, MARKETSCOPE FOR E-DIscoVERY Sorr-
WARE PRODUCT VENDORS (2009), available at http://www.gartner.com/technology/media-
products/reprints/ca/vol2/article2/article2.html. By 2009, the market consisted of more
than 600 e-discovery vendors. See George Socha & Tom Gelbmann, Strange Times, LAW TECH.
NEWS (Aug. 1, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/PubArticlePrinterFriendlyjsp?id=12024
35558482.
70. See Jason Krause, When Is an E-Discovery Burden an Undue Burden?, L. TECH. NEWS
(June 1, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleFriendlyLTNjsp?
id=1202458961735.
71. See George Socha & Tom Gelbmann, Climbing Back, L. TECH. NEWS (Aug. 1, 2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleFriendlyLTN.jsp?id=1202463900292.
72. Socha & Gelbmann, supra note 71.
73. James N. Dertouzos, Nicholas M. Pace & Robert H. Anderson, The Legal and Eco-
nomic Implications of Electronic Discovery: Options for Future Research, RAND INST. FOR Civ.
JusT. 3 (2008), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional-papers/2008/
RANDOP183.pdf; cf VRA PARTNERS, LLC, INDUSTRY REVIEW: LEGAL SUPPORT 6 (2009),
available at http://www.vrapartners.com/pdf/legal-support-newsletter-0409.pdf (estimating
that the ratio of e-discovery review costs to processing costs is 5:1).
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can be identified." Manual review of one GB of ESI75 has an esti-
mated average cost of $32,000-$40,00.
Attorney review for privilege and the preparation of privilege
logs constitute the single most costly steps in the e-discovery pro-
cess. The qualitative differences between electronic and paper
documents account for part of this cost. Electronic documents
tend to be more informal, use more abbreviations and shorthand,
and are much more ambiguous than their paper counterparts.
This ambiguity forces additional review time. Costs also multiply
74. See Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Commack, Technology-Assisted Review in E-
Discovery Can be More Effective and More Efficient than Exhaustive Manual Review, 17 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 11, at *6 (2011) ("In current practice, the problem of identifying responsive (or privi-
leged) ESI, once it has been collected, is almost always addressed, at least in part, by a
manual review process, the cost of which dominates the e-discovery process.").
75. One GB of ESI is the equivalent of approximately 80,000-100,000 typewritten
pages of text. See Donald Wochna, Electronic Data, Electronic Searching, Inadvertent Production
of Privileged Data: A Perfect Storm, 43 AKRON L. REV. 847, 853 (2010). A much higher con-
version estimate of 500,000 pages of text per GB comes from THE MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004), but is subject to some dispute. See VIEW FROM THE
FRONTLINES, supra note 45, at 5 & n.10; Craig Ball, Expert Explodes PageEquivalency Myth, L.
TECH. NEWS, (Aug. 8,2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.
jsp?id=1186477613170 ("Scholarly articles and reported decisions pass around the 500,000
pages per gigabyte value like a bad cold. Yet, 500,000 pages per gigabyte is not right. It's not
even particularly close to right."). Page equivalency numbers vary considerably when they
are not expressed in a common currency-the number of pages in a document file varies
widely as a function of the file type and its characteristics. According to one estimate, the
average number of pages per GB varies from a low of 17,552 for PowerPoint files to a high of
677,963 for text files. Word files average 64,782 pages and e-mail files average 100,099 pages.
See LExISNEXIS DISCOVERY SERVICES, How MANY PAGES IN A GIGABYTE?, (2008), available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/lawlibrary/whitePapers/ADIFSPagesInAGig
abyte.pdf.
76. Wochna, supra note 75, at 853. This estimate can vary widely, depending on billa-
ble rates and the efficiency of the document reviewer. The stated estimate assumes an
average billable rate of $200 per hour and that a single attorney can review 500 pages of data
per hour with acceptable accuracy. Id. at 853; see also The Sedona Conference, Best Practices
Commentary on the Use of Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8 SEDONA CONF.
J. 189, 192 (2007) (noting the huge cost differential between the $1 required to store a GB
of data and the $30,000 required to review it).
77. Julie Grantham, Managing E-Discovery Costs from the Vendor Perspective, 51 THE AD-
voc. (TExAS) 57 (2010) ("The most expensive component of any e-discovery project is
human document review , . . ."); Wochna, supra note 75, at 852-53; see also FULBRIGHT &
JAWORSKI L.L.P., E-DISCOVERY TRENDS: E-DISCOVERY FINDINGS FROM THE 2005-2009 FuL-
BRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P. LITIGATION TRENDS SURVEY 4 (2009), available at http://
civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/dcc/main.nsf/$defaultview/F873BA28DC4854F38
525767E004A4F9A/$File/Fulbright's%20E-Discovery%20trends.pdf?OpenElement (report-
ing that in a 2007 national survey of general counsel or senior litigation counsel from more
than 300 corporations, more than 50 percent of respondents said privilege reviews account-
ed for more than 5 percent of their litigation spending in the previous 12 months, and 26
percent said that such reviews consumed between 20 percent and 50 percent of their annual
litigation expenditure).
78. See, e.g., Adam Hurwitz & Alon Israely, Tweet This: Social Networking May Count in
EDD, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 20, 2010, at 14 (noting extreme challenge of searching messages on
social-networking sites like Twitter and Facebook).
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when e-mail strings are reviewed and logged. Each e-mail in the
chain may need to be reviewed and logged separately79 because on-
ly privileged communications that are adequately identified may
properly be withheld from production of an e-mail chain.so
Costs multiply again when potentially privileged metadata are
involved. Metadata are information describing the history, track-
ing, or management of an electronic file. They have no
counterpart in the world of paper discovery. There are different
types of metadata,8' which can include privileged or confidential
information. Metadata can serve to indicate the date an electronic
file was created, its author, when and by whom it was edited, what
edits were made, and in the case of e-mail, the history of its trans-
mission." Depending on the circumstances, metadata showing the
date a document was created, altered, or transmitted may be im-
portant to claims or defenses. Metadata may also be useful to
establish the authenticity of a document under the FRE and state
1 83rules.
The word "metadata" does not appear in the FRCP. It is likely
that the rules are deliberately silent, probably because the Advisory
Committee did not feel sufficiently confident to establish a rule in
this still-developing area of the law." Nevertheless, litigants seeking
the production of ESI increasingly target production of the ac-
companying metadata, and requests made early in a case are
generally granted." To the extent that production is required, this
can dramatically increase the cost of e-discovery. The process of
79. SeeJohn M. Facciola & Jonathan M. Redgrave, Asserting and Challenging Privilege Claims
in Modern Litigation: TheFacciola-Redgrave Framework, 4 FED. CTS. L. REv. 19, 37-38 (2010).
80. See Muro v. Target Corp., 243 F.R.D. 301 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
81. See Douglas L. Rogers, A Search for Balance in the Discovery of ESI Since December 1,
2006, 14 RIcH.J.L. & TECH. 8, at 83 (2008) (describing four types of metadata).
82. BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN, RONALD J. HEDGES & ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS, FEDERAL
JUSTICE CENTER, MANAGING DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION: A POCKET GUIDE
FOR JUDGEs 3 (2007), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/eldscpkt.pdf/
$file/eldscpkt.pdf.
83. See Philip J. Favro, A New Frontier in Electronic Evidence: Preserving and Obtaining
Metadata, 13 B.U.J. Sa. & TECH. L.J. 1, 11-12 (2007).
84. See Thomas Y. Allman, The Impact of the Proposed Federal e-Discovery Rules, 12 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 13, at 15 (2006) ("The Advisory Committee discussed the competing concerns
at some length but ultimately decided that the best course of action was to remain silent and
leave the issue to individual case law development.").
85. See In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1769, 2007 WL 219989, at *4 (M.D. Jan.
26, 2007); Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 656 (D. Kan. 2005) (requir-
ing production of metadata); Tresa Baldas, Metadata Grows in Legal Import-Litigation
Demanding Production of Metadata is Roiling the Courts, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 26, 2009, at 4. But see
Autotech Techs. P'ship v. AutomationDirect.com, Inc., 248 F.R.D. 556, 559 (N.D. Ill. 2008)
(denying request to require metadata production); Kentucky Speedway, LLC v. Nat'l Ass'n
of Stock Car Auto Racing, No. 05-138-WOB, 2006 WL 5097354 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 18, 2006) (re-
jecting Williams as "not persuasive").
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extracting and reviewing metadata to identify and redact privileged
* * 86information is very time-consuming.
Accounting for the range of electronic discovery activities, reve-
nues for the e-discovery industry as a whole, including records
management and litigation-readiness plans, were expected to in-
crease from $9.7 billion in 2006 to $21.8 billion in 2011.7 In sum,
the accelerating cost and importance of e-discovery in civil litiga-
tion are unmistakable.
III. THE 2006 AND 2008 AMENDMENTS FAILED TO
SOLVE THE E-DISCOVERY COST PROBLEM
A. The 2006 Amendments
The FRCP were amended in 2006 (the 2006 Amendments) to
address the dramatically expanding importance and cost of elec-
tronic discovery.88 This was the tenth time that Rule 26" was
amended since the FRCP were adopted in 1938, and the sixth time
that Rule 3790 was amended."' The amendments made three major
86. See CP Solutions PTE, Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 3:04 cv 2150 (JBA) (WIG), 2006
WL 1272615, at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 6, 2006) (declining to order production of metadata
because redaction for privilege would be unduly burdensome); Adam K Israel, Note, To
Scrub or Not to Scrub: The Ethical Implications of Metadata and Electronic Data Creation, Exchange,
and Discovery, 60 ALA. L. REV. 469, 496 (2009) ("[T]he hours logged reviewing metadata for
privileged or protected information will likely be extremely costly.").
87. VIEW FROM THE FRONTLINES, supra note 45, at 15-16.
88. See Emery G. Lee III, Effectiveness of the 2006 Rules Amendments, 11 SEDONA CONF. J.
191 (2010) (identifying objectives of the 2006 Amendments). E-discovery rule-making has
not been limited to the national level. More than fifty federal district courts have adopted
local rules to address e-discovery issues. See Lee H. Rosenthal, Electronic Discovery-Is the System
Broken? Can it be Fixed?, 51 THE ADvoc. (Thx.) 8 (2010) (discussing problems associated with
proliferation of local rules); AM. COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF THE AM. LEGAL Sys., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE
OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 14 (2009), available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.
cfm?Section=Home&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=4008. In addition, by
early 2011 at least thirty states had adopted some form of e-discovery rules. Susan Beck, judges
are Imposing Fewer Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations, Report Says, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 19, 2011, at 6.
Many of these rules derive from uniform e-discovery rules for state courts developed by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. These uniform rules track
changes instituted at the federal level by the 2006 Amendments. VIEW FROM THE FRONT-
LINES, supra note 45, at 6.
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (Rule 26 covers the duty to disclose and general provisions gov-
erning discovery).
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (Rule 37 covers the failure to make disclosures or cooperate in
discovery, and sanctions).
91. Rule 26 was amended in 1946, 1963, 1966, 1970, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1993, 2000, and
2006. Rule 37 was amended in 1948, 1970, 1980, 1987, 2000, and 2006. These amendments
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changes: a two-tiered proportionality approach was applied to the
scope of e-discovery, a safe harbor provision was created to protect
parties from certain sanctions relating to e-discovery, and "quick
peek" and "clawback" agreements to prevent inadvertent privilege
waivers were endorsed. Each of these changes is discussed in detail
below.
1. Proportionality
The 2006 amendments implemented a two-tiered proportionali-
ty approach to the scope of e-discovery. The proportionality
principle states that a party is not required to provide discovery
when the potential benefits are outweighed by the associated bur-
dens or costs. Pursuant to Rule 26(b) (2) (B), a responding party is
not required to produce ESI from sources that the party identifies
as "not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost." 92
Common examples are backup tapes, which are often held to be
inaccessible." If a requesting party seeks discovery of ESI that is not
reasonably accessible, that party has the burden of demonstrating
good cause for production. However, as in the case of Rule 26(c),
good cause is undefined.9 As a result, courts are required to bal-
ance the requesting party's need for the information and its
relevance against the burden and expense imposed on the re-
sponding party under Rule 26(b) (2) (C) (i)-(iii). But courts are
given limited guidance about how to weigh the competing inter-
ests.96 Proportionality concerns are typically raised in a motion to
compel or request for a protective order under Rule 26(c). A court
included technical modifications. Both Rules 26 and 37 have been further amended since
2006. In 2006, amendments also were made to Rules 16, 33, 34, and 45.
92. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (2) (B).
93. See Radian Asset Assur., Inc. v. Coll. of the Christian Bros. of New Mexico, No. CIV
09-0885, 2010 UT 4928866, at *5 (D.N.M. Oct. 22, 2010).
94. See David K Isom, The Burden of Discovering Inaccessible Electronically Stored Infor-
mation: Rules 26(b)(2)(B) and 45(d)(1)(D), 3 FED. CTS. L. REv. 39, 55 (2009) ("Most courts
that have addressed the Rule 26(b) (2) (B) allocation of burdens have held that, once the
responding party proves inaccessibility, the seeking party has the burden of proving good
cause for production of the inaccessible ESI.").
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (2) (B).
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (2) (C) (providing that the court must limit the frequency or
extent of discovery if it determines that: "(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative
or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity
to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the
action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues").
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that orders discovery from inaccessible sources for good cause may
specify conditions, the most important of which is cost-shifting to
mitigate costs.
Before the 2006 Amendments, there was no universally accepted
framework for shifting ESI production costs. Instead, courts ap-
plied three primary tests, derived from three district court cases of
the early 2000s: McPeek v. Ashcroft,97 Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William
Morris Agency, Inc.," and Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC " Each of the-
se cases involved requests for ESI available exclusively on backup
tapes. McPeek applied a marginal utility analysis, holding that the
more likely it is that ESI contains information that is relevant to a
claim or defense, the fairer it is that the responding party pay search
costs.on Rowe, a racial discrimination case, went one step further and
listed eight factors to guide courts in deciding whether to shift
costs.'o' Zubulake, a gender discrimination case, refined and priori-
tized the Rowe factors, reduced the list to seven,1o2 and emerged as
the most common approach to the cost-shifting issue.' 0 '
Amended Rule 26 does not codify any of the foregoing
approaches. Indeed, the text of the rule does not mention cost-
shifting. The Advisory Committee's Note does include, however, a
list of seven factors that it considers relevant to a determination of
whether good cause exists to require discovery of ESI that is not
reasonably accessible.' 4 This list liberally borrows from both Rowe
and Zubulake, but is not coextensive with either.1 15 The similarities
to Rowe and Zubulake do not resolve the question of whether the list
is designed to provide guidance in making a cost-shifting determi-
nation, in addition to providing guidance concerning good cause
for the production of inaccessible ESI. To date, courts have not
reached consensus on this issue.06
97. 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001).
98. 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
99. 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
100. 202 F.R.D. at 34.
101. 205 F.R.D. at 429.
102. 217 F.R.D. at 322-23.
103. Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better: The Economics
of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 902 (2009) (noting that Zubu-
lake "has not drawn universal adherence"); Bradley T. Tennis, Comment, Cost-Shifting in
Electronic Discovery, 119 YALE L.J. 1113, 1114 (2010).
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note (2006).
105. See Tennis, supra note 103, at 1118 ("[T]he Zubulake test and the amendment test
exhibit significant differences that preclude straightfonvard harmonization.").
106. See Vlad Vainberg, Comment, When Should Discovery Come with a Bill? Assessing Cost




The 2006 Amendments created a "safe harbor" provision in Rule
37 (e): "Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose
sanctions [on a party] for failing to provide [ESI] lost as a result of
the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information
system." 07 The drafters of Rule 37(e) designed the safe harbor to
protect against sanctions "arising solely from the loss of ESI
through the routine operation of electronic systems that automati-
cally discard information."0 8 "Good faith" is not defined in Rule 37,
but the Advisory Committee's Notes state that good faith may re-
quire that a party intervene to modify or suspend certain routine
features of a computer system to prevent the loss of information
that is subject to a preservation obligation.o"
3. Quick Peek and Clawback Agreements
The 2006 Amendments permit the parties to agree in advance
that inadvertent production of privileged materials does not auto-
matically waive privilege."o Specifically, amended Rule 26 endorses
both "quick peek" and "clawback" agreements. Quick peek agree-
ments allow the requesting party to "peek" at the producing party's
ESI before any preproduction review. The requesting party then
identifies the particular documents it wants and the producing par-
ty can limit its privilege review to those documents. In exchange,
the requesting party agrees that it will not use or claim waiver over
documents it examined during the quick peek. Clawback agree-
ments provide that privileged or protected documents inadvertently
produced during discovery will be returned without a waiver of privi-
lege. While the text of Rule 26 does not mention quick peek or
clawback agreements, the 2006 Advisory Committee's Note to Rule
26(f) discusses clawbacks as a way to reduce discovery costs and
minimize the risk of privilege waiver."
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
108. Dan H. Willoughby, Jr., et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the Numbers, 60
DUKE L.J. 789, 824 (2010).
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee's note (2006).
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) advisory committee's note (2006) (noting that Rule
26(b) (5) (B) works in tandem with Rules 26(f) and 16(b) to permit parties to ask the court
to include in an order agreements concerning privilege waiver).
111. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory committee's note (2006).
425WINTER 2012]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
4. The Changes Fail to Reduce E-Discovery Costs
Each of the three major changes to the 2006 amendments fails
to significantly reduce the escalating cost of e-discovery. The pro-
portionality standard incorporated into the Rule 26(b) (2) good
cause requirement is likely to have little positive impact, based
on prior experience with a substantially similar requirement
incorporated into Rule 26(b) by amendment in 1983.'12 That re-
quirement, designed to curb discovery abuses of the pre-ESI era, is
generally regarded as a failure because courts ignored proportion-
ality concerns following the amendment.113 Because modern
e-discovery presents a much broader and deeper array of challeng-
es, there is no reason to assume that the 2006 Amendments will
fare any better. One problem is the significant difficulty of as-
sessing the cost of e-discovery before it has been conducted."' A
second problem is the great difficulty judges have in deciding
when the cost of discovery is proportional to the benefit. This is
particularly true in cases that do not involve economic damages.
Further complicating the proportionality analysis, the good
cause requirement of Rule 26(b) (2) (B) leaves judges with little
guidance and virtually unfettered discretion to order discovery of
ESI that is not reasonably accessible. Rule 26(b) (2) (B) does not
define good cause and it does not provide that good cause can be
derived from the seven factors identified in the Advisory Commit-
tee's Note or the limitations in Rules 26(b)(2)(C)(i)-(iii).
Subsequent to 2006, neither the Civil Rules Advisory Committee
nor the Federal Judicial Center has provided additional guidance
concerning the meaning of good cause."' Moreover, the FRCP
contains numerous good cause standards even within the limited
framework of discovery rules. These standards are subject to signif-
icantly different interpretations by the courts. Not only do they fail
to provide guidance concerning good cause under 26(b) (2) (B),
but they also contradict the canon of statutory construction that a
single term used multiple times in the same rule should receive the
same interpretation."6
112. See Moss, supra note 103, at 905.
113. See id. at 899-901.
114. See Reduce the E-Discovery Burden--You and Your Law Finns' Anecdotal Evidence and Da-
ta Can Help, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNSEL, Apr. 2010, at 11 ("It is hard to apply the
proportionality principle because it is very difficult to assess the cost of discovery up front.")
(quoting interview with Thomas M. Mueller, Partner, Morrison & Foerster LLP).
115. See Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discovery Rules, 21 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 49, 71 & n.102 (2007).
116. Id. at 71-72.
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Because Rule 26(b) (2) (B) provides no clear boundaries con-
cerning good cause, it fails to provide any additional protection
against the rising cost of e-discovery. The absence of boundaries
may even encourage parties to seek broad e-discovery from sources
which are difficult and expensive to search, driving up costs for
their adversaries."7 This danger is magnified because it is unclear
whether the seven factors are designed to guide the cost-shifting
determination, and it is further magnified by the increasing rarity
of cost-shifting orders following the 2006 Amendments. A 2010
survey found that only thirty-five federal cases addressed cost-
shifting since December 1, 2006, and only one of them yielded a
contested cost-shifting order."" The rarity of cost-shifting orders
further minimizes the incentive for parties to limit their discovery
requests.
The safe harbor provision in Rule 37(e) has not provided much
protection to parties or counsel. The provision provides no guid-
ance concerning what data must be preserved or the manner of
preservation. Moreover, judges have tended to give the Rule the
narrow application that the drafters intended. From the promulga-
tion of Rule 37(c) on December 1, 2006, until January 1, 2010,
only twenty-seven federal court decisions relating to discovery of
ESI in civil cases cited the safe harbor provision. 120 Of these deci-
sions, no more than eight invoked Rule 37(e) to deny sanctions in
whole or in part. 2 ' Given the limited protection that Rule 37(e)
provides, parties have no incentive to limit the costly preservation
and production of potentially relevant evidence. Finally, as is ex-
plained in more detail in connection with the 2008 Amendments,
the quick peek and clawback agreements contemplated by amended
117. John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation Reform,
60 DUKE L.J. 547, 583 (2010).
118. See Vainberg, supra note 106, at 1565-66; accord Martin H. Redish & Colleen
McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost Allocation and Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 773, 781-83 (2011) ("[T]he use of cost shifting remains extremely limited-if
not all but nonexistent .... [C]ost shifting has proven more popular among scholars than
among federal district court judges[.]").
119. See, e.g., Roy W. Breitenbach & Alicia M. Wilson, Managing the Fact Discovery Tsuna-
mi: Tips When Defending a Federal Antitrust Case, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 18, 2011, at S8 (noting that
absence of cost-shifting means "there is little incentive for antitrust plaintiffs to limit discov-
ery").
120. Willoughby, supra note 108, at 825.
121. Id.; see also Alexander B. Hastings, Note, A Solution to the Spoliation Chaos: Rule
37(e)s Unfulfilled Potential to Bring Uniformity to Electronic Spoliation Disputes, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 860, 876 (2011) ("An examination of the caselaw makes apparent that, overall, courts
have erred on the side of caution and have narrowly interpreted the protections of Rule
37(e).").
122. See infra text accompanying notes 139-141.
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Rule 26 of the FRCP and new Rule 502 of the FRE offer only limited
potential for cost savings.
The cumulative result is that the 2006 Amendments have not
significantly reduced costs. Only 22.1 percent of the respondents
in a 2010 survey of all U.S. magistrate judges reported that Rule
26(b) (2) (B) was frequently effective in limiting the cost and bur-
den of discovery, and only 19.5 percent reported that Rule
26(b) (2) (C) frequently limited the cost and burden. Two 2009
surveys of attorneys, limited to those who participated in e-
discovery cases since December 1, 2006, also found that the new
rules were ineffective in reducing costs.124
B. The 2008 Amendments
FRE Rule 502 was amended in 2008 to control the spiraling cost
of preproduction privilege review in a discovery environment
overwhelmed by ESI.12" Rule 502, which is designed to be read in
tandem with FRCP Rule 26(b) (5) (B), addresses the mechanics of
privilege waiver for documents subject to attorney-client privilege
and work-product protection. Before its enactment, there was no
uniform approach to determine whether and to what extent privi-
lege was waived upon the inadvertent disclosure of privileged
information; instead, the outcome in any diversity case turned on
the applicable state privilege law.12
Rule 502 attempts to standardize the federal approach to the
disclosure of a communication covered by attorney-client privilege
or work-product protection. 1 Section (a) limits the scope of any
123. Emery G. Lee III & KennethJ. Withers, Survey of United States Magistratejudges on the
Effectiveness of the 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 11 SEDONA CONF. J.
201, 205 (2010).
124. Roughly half of all attorneys surveyed by the ABA and ACTL Reports responded
that the 2006 Amendments failed to provide cost-effective discovery of ESI in a majority of
cases. Lee, supra note 88, at 198. Moreover, according to the ABA Report, 45.7 percent of
defense attorneys responded that the 2006 Amendments never provide for cost-effective
discovery of ESI. Id.
125. See Facciola & Redgrave, supra note 79, at 30 ("Rule 502 was enacted to meet the
obvious concern that in a world where a four gigabyte 'thumb drive' now costs less than
twelve dollars, the costs of review on a file-by-file basis of the contents of a client's hard drive
or server would soon dwarf the actual value of the case.").
126. See Hopson v. Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 235-36 (D. Md. 2005) (discussing differ-
ent tests used by federal courts).
127. In federal actions based on diversity jurisdiction, federal courts apply state substan-
tive law, including state law of privilege. FED. R. EviD. 501.
128. See FED. R. EvID. 502 advisory committee's note (2008); see also Henry S. Noyes,
Federal Rule of Evidence 502: Stirring the State Law of Privilege and Professional Responsibility with a
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waiver to material inadvertently produced in a federal case or to a
federal agency, thereby precluding broad subject matter waiver.
Protection is lost if the producing party intentionally waived the
privilege, the disclosed and undisclosed information concern the
same subject matter, and the disclosed and undisclosed infor-
mation should fairly be considered together.129 For example, where
a party deliberately discloses privileged information in an effort to
gain a tactical advantage.o3 0
Section (b) precludes waiver in a federal or state proceeding for
information produced in a federal case or to a federal agency if the
disclosure was inadvertent and the producing party took reasona-
ble steps to prevent disclosure and retrieve the material upon
discovering the disclosure.1 3 ' The producing party has the burden
of establishing each of the three factors.1 2 In most cases, the key
factor is likely to be the reasonableness of the steps taken to pre-
vent disclosure. 13 The Advisory Committee's Note identifies some
additional factors that pertain to the reasonableness of a party's
actions to prevent disclosure, beyond those listed in the text of the
rule.' Neither the Note nor the text of the rule addresses the
question of whether waiver must be resolved by the federal court in
which the disclosure occurred, or instead may be resolved in a sub-
sequent federal or state proceeding. 1"
Sections (c)-(e) are designed to make non-waiver agreements
enforceable in subsequent proceedings and against subsequent
parties. Section (c) provides that disclosure at the state level will
not waive privilege in a federal proceeding if it would not have
constituted a waiver in federal court or under that state's law."6
Section (d) provides that, if a federal court ordered that a privilege
was not waived, the order is binding on all other federal and state
Federal Stick, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 673, 759 (2009) (referring to Rule 502 as "the first step
in the federalization of state privilege law").
129. FED. R. EVID. 502(a).
130. GATX Corp. v. Appalachian Fuels, LLC, No. 09-41-DLB, 2010 WL 5067688, at *6
(E.D. Ky. Dec. 7,2010).
131. FED. R. EvID. 502(b).
132. Dubler v. Hangsterfer's Labs., No. 09-5144 (RBK/JS), 2011 WL 90244, at *5 (D.N.J.
Jan. 11, 2011); Peterson v. Bernardi, 262 F.R.D. 424, 427 (D.N.J. 2009).
133. See, e.g., Conceptus, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., No. C 09-02280, 2010 WL 3911943, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2010) (finding waiver where plaintiff acted promptly to retrieve privileged
material but failed to take reasonable steps to prevent disclosure); Felman Prod., Inc. v.
Indus. Risk Insurers, Civ. Action No. 3:09-0481, 2010 WL 2944777, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. July 23,
2010) (same).
134. FED. R. EvID. 502(b) advisory committee's note (2008).
135. Jonathan M. Redgrave & Jennifer J. Kehoe, New Federal Rule of Evidence 502: Privileg-
es, Obligations, and Opportunities, 56 FED. L. 34 (2009).
136. FED. R. EVID. 502(c).
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court proceedings.' Section (e) provides that a waiver agreement
entered into by parties in a federal proceeding only binds the par-
ties to the agreement unless it is incorporated into a court order.3 1
Accordingly, if a quick peek or clawback agreement is incorporated
into a federal court order, it binds both signatories and non-
signatories in all other federal or state proceedings.
Rule 502 has a number of drawbacks that limit its cost-saving poten-
tial. First, the bell cannot be un-rung. Once privileged information is
disclosed to an adversary, it cannot be retrieved -even if the docu-
ments themselves are subject to clawback agreements. Such
disclosures have the potential to dramatically undermine a party's
ability to effectively litigate a case. The privileged information can
suggest and shape, inter alia, an adversary's written discovery requests,
deposition questions, witness preparation, settlement and trial strate-
gy, and trial examination questions.'3 ' Accordingly, prudent counsel
may be reluctant to rely on quick peek or clawback agreements, and
expensive preproduction privilege reviews will continue as before.
Not surprisingly, in a 2010 survey of all U.S. magistrate judges,
more than 80 percent of respondents reported that quick peek
discovery is rarely used.o4 0 The magistrate judges reported that
clawback agreements were used more often, but less than one-
quarter of the judges reported that such agreements were used on
a frequent basis.1
Second, while Rule 502 permits disclosure of privileged infor-
mation, the rules of professional conduct forbid such disclosure
absent fully informed consent by the client. Rule 1.1 of the ABA's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which provide a template for
the ethics codes of many states, requires a lawyer to use diligence
and care in representation.'4 2 Entering into non-waiver agreements,
absent client consent, could constitute a violation of this provision
if privileged documents are produced and that production materi-
ally damages the client's case.
137. Id. 502(d).
138. Id. 502(e).
139. See VIEW FROM THE FRONTLINES, supra note 45, at 20 ("[P]rivileged information,
once learned, cannot be unlearned and it can permeate and alter the course of a case.").
140. Lee & Withers, supra note 123, at 213.
141. Id.
142. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2003).
143. See Noyes, supra note 128, at 743 ("In order to be effective, however, Rule 502 must
preempt state rules of professional responsibility that impose duties on lawyers to zealously
protect their clients' confidential information and to conduct this review before turning
over the client's documents to a litigation adversary during discovery."); THE SEDONA CON-
FERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR
ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 37 (2004), available at http://www.
thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/SedonaPrinciples200401.pdf (noting that use
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Third, while Rule 502(b) eliminates waiver for inadvertent dis-
closures when the disclosing party has taken reasonable steps to
protect the privilege, the uncertain scope of what constitutes such
steps vitiates the available protection. The Advisory Committee's
Note refers to the five-factor test'4 previously used by most federal
courts,15 but the test is not codified in Rule 502. Moreover, courts
have divergent views of what is reasonable, and they focus on and
weigh the relevant factors differently. This was true before Rule 502
was enacted and it remains true post-enactment.4 6 The result is
that steps taken in one case may suffice to avoid waiver, but the
same steps may be insufficient in another case. 4 1 Some pre-Rule
502 federal court decisions suggest that parties defending the rea-
sonableness of their conduct face significant obstacles. These
obstacles may include satisfaction of the strict expert witness re-
quirements of FRE Rule 702148 if parties are required to defend the
reasonableness of their search methodology. 49 But even if Rule 702
need not be satisfied, various courts imposed a demanding
"reasonable steps" standard before the passage of the 2008
of clawback agreements may result in violations of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct).
144. The five factors are: (1) the reasonableness of steps taken to prevent disclosure;
(2) the amount of time taken to remedy the inadvertent disclosure; (3) the scope of discov-
ery; (4) the extent of disclosure; and (5) the overriding issue of fairness or justice. See First
American CoreLogic, Inc. v. Fiserv, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-132-TJW, 2010 WL 4975566, at *3
(E.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2010).
145. FED. R. EvID. 502, Explanatory Note; American Coal Sales Co. v. Nova Scotia Pow-
er, Inc., No. 2:06-cy-94, 2009 WL 4677576, at *17 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 23, 2009).
146. Gareth T. Evans & Farrah Pepper, Federal Rule of Evidence 502: Getting to Know an
Important E-Discovery Tool, 51 ORANGE COUNTY LAw., Nov. 2009, at 10. See Heriot v. Byrne,
257 F.R.D. 645, 655 (N.D. Ill. 2009) ("In applying FRE 502(b), the court is free to consider
any or all of the five [I factors . . . ."). Heriot criticized the "rather peculiar" approach of
another decision, Rhoads Indus., Inc. v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., 254 F.R.D. 216, 218-27
(E.D. Pa. 2008), which chose to adopt the five factors as a "wholesale test of inadvertent
disclosure," rather than use the factors to supplement the required analysis under Rule
502(b). Id. at 655 n.7.
147. See Roger P. Meyers, An Analysis of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 and Its Early Applica-
tion, 55 WAYNE L. REv. 1441, 1458 (2009) ("[T]he actual application of 502(b) is likely to be
idiosyncratic in any given case. These are many of the same factors that courts had already
been using to arrive at very different outcomes on closely analogous factual circumstanc-
es."); Paula Schaefer, The Future of Inadvertent Disclosure: The Lingering Need to Revise
Professional Conduct Rules, 69 MD. L. REv. 195, 219-20 (2010) (noting that FRE 502(b) "in-
corporates the same uncertainty and possibility of waiver" that existed before the 2008
Amendments); Robert D. Owen & Melissa H. Cozart, FRE 502, One Year Later, N.Y.L.J., Oct.
5, 2009, at S4.
148. See FED. R. EvID. 702.
149. See Jeane A. Thomas, David D. Cross & Courtney Ingraffia Barton, Reducing the
Costs of Privilege Review and Logs, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 23, 2009, at S 1.
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Amendments. 10 If courts continue this practice following the
enactment of Rule 502, litigants will be required to design and
execute strict document review protocols that will fail to contain
151costs.
Fourth, district courts have misconstrued Rule 502 by improperly
grafting a "reasonableness" test onto sections of the rule where the
test is absent from the text. One example of this misconstruction is
provided by Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, LLC, "2 a district court case hold-
ing that quick peek and clawback agreements could not be
endorsed by court order unless the producing party had taken rea-
sonable steps to protect the privilege."" This decision is inconsistent
with Rule 502(d)'s Explanatory Note, which makes clear that a con-
fidentiality order "may provide for return of documents without
waiver irrespective of the care taken by the disclosing party[.]"154
Another example of misconstruction is provided by district
courts that have grafted a "reasonableness" test onto Rule 502(b),
which addresses inadvertent disclosure. The rule provides for non-
waiver if: (1) the disclosure was inadvertent, (2) the disclosing
party took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure, and (3) the dis-
closing party promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error.
Nothing in the text of the rule suggests that subsection (1) incor-
150. See, e.g., Victor Stanley Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 262 (D. Md.
2008) (holding that selection of methodology to search for privileged documents must be
made with "utmost care" in order to avoid privilege waiver); see also Paul W. Grimm, Lisa
Yurwit Bergstrom & Matthew P. Kraeuter, Federal Rule of Evidence 502: Has it Lived up to its
Potential?, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8, at 50 (2011) [hereinafter FRE 502 Potential] ("Rule 502
will never reach its intended goal of reducing the cost of ESI discovery and encouraging the
use of computer analytical review methodology if courts demand near-perfection in prepro-
duction precautions.")
151. See Thomas F. Munno & Benjamin R. Barnett, New Federal Rule of Evidence Arrives,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 1, 2008, at S2 ("FRE 502 does not define 'reasonable steps,' but case law
before adoption of the Rule and common sense dictate that anything short of a document-
by-document review of potentially privileged documents may not be reasonable. Thus, the
reasonable step requirement imposes the very expense the Rule was designed to mitigate.").
152. Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, LLC, No. 07-1225-EFM, 2009 WL 2168892 (D. Kan.
July 21, 2009).
153. Id. at *3 & n.6.
154. FED. R. EvID. 502(d) Explanatory Note; see also Rajala v. McGuire Woods, LLP, No.
08-2638-CM-DJW, 2010 WL 2949582, at *3 (D. Kan. July 22, 2010) (noting that under a
clawback provision, "typically, the materials are returned irrespective of the care taken by
the disclosing party"); FRE Potential, supra note 150, at 79 ("Rulings such as that rendered in
Spieker fly in the face of the clear intent of Rule 502 and ignore the rule's explicit provi-
sions."); H. Christopher Boehning & Daniel J. Toal, Kansas Case Casts Doubt on Usefulness of
Rule 502, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 27, 2009, at 5 (arguing that Spieker decision is "entirely at odds with
the purpose and history behind the adoption of Rule 502"). But cf Jessica Wang, Comment,
Nonwaiver Agreements After Federal Rule of Evidence 502: A Glance at Quick-Peek and Clawback
Agreements, 56 UCLA L. REv. 1835, 1840 (2009) (arguing that courts should refuse to en-
force nonwaiver agreements which seek to preserve privilege in the absence of document
review or where the review has been grossly negligent).
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porates a "reasonableness" evaluation, but several courts have nev-
ertheless invoked a reasonableness standard to determine whether
production of privileged documents was inadvertent.'5 This ap-
proach is cumbersome, redundant, and confusing."5
The 2008 Amendments have not reduced costs. In a 2009 na-
tional survey of general counsel or senior litigation counsel from
approximately 300 corporations, 93 percent of respondents re-
ported that Rule 502 had not resulted in any cost savings for their
companies, and none of the respondents reported that Rule 502
had produced significant savings.' 8 Numerous commentators have
reached the same conclusion.159
Neither the 2006 Amendments nor the 2008 Amendments have
significantly curbed the rapidly growing cost of e-discovery. Most
importantly, the Amendments fail to address the timing of
e-discovery. They do nothing to curb the practice of imposing on-
erous e-discovery obligations on parties before motions to dismiss
are resolved.'60 Thus, the optimal solution is to impose a mandatory
stay on e-discovery, and the PSLRA provides a successful model.
IV. THE PSLRA DISCOVERY STAY
A. Background
Prior to the PSLRA's enactment in 1995, defendants in federal
securities cases were required to participate in discovery during the
155. Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471-PAB-KMT, 2009 HL 4949959,
at *11 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2009); Heriotv. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645, 655 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
156. FRE 502 Potential, supra note 150, at 37.
157. FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P., E-DISCOVERY TRENDs: E-DISCOVERY FINDINGS





159. See, e.g., FRE 502 Potential, supra note 150, at 99 (noting that FRE 502 has failed to
fulfill its purpose, in large part because courts have not construed it consistently with its
purpose or with each other); Noyes, supra note 128, at 752 ("In many ways, Rule 502 does
not eliminate the cost of conducting a privilege review; it simply shifts that cost and burden
to the requesting party."); Owen & Cozart, supra note 147, at S1O ("[Amended Rule 502]
does not provide large cost savings.").
160. See Michael H. Gruenglas, Robert A. Fumerton & Patrick G. Rideout, A Proposal to
Prevent Blackmail at the Pleading Stage-Stay Discovery Pending Motions to Dismiss, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 5,
2009, at S16 ("[NJone of these amendments addresses the timing of e-discovery costs or
deters the use of e-discovery in meritless litigation to extract settlements from defendants.
Indeed, by making e-discovery a focal point at the outset of every case, these amendments to
Rule 26 not only ignore the ever-increasing in terrorem effect on defendants, but actually
compound the problem.").
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pendency of motions to dismiss. Defendants could avoid discovery
only by moving for a protective order, requesting a stay, and
showing good cause under FRCP Rule 26(c) ." Such motions were
typically denied.12 However, the PSLRA substantially modified the
rules of the game. The Act provides, in relevant part, that "[i] n any
private action arising under this chapter, all discovery and other
proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to
dismiss, unless the court finds upon the motion of any party that
particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to pre-
vent undue prejudice to that party."6 3
The Act's legislative history indicates that Congress included the
mandatory stay provision for two primary reasons. The first was to
prevent plaintiffs from filing securities class actions with the intent
to use the discovery process to force coercive settlements. 164 The
cost of discovery in class action securities litigation can be extraor-
dinarily high, in both dollars and business resources, with coercive
settlements a likely result. One estimate presented to Congress was
that 80 percent of the cost of litigating securities class actions was
associated with discovery.6 5 Moreover, discovery costs in securities
litigation are highly asymmetrical: they are borne largely by de-
fendants.'66 Congress concluded that the high "cost of discovery
often forces innocent parties to settle frivolous securities class ac-
tions."" The second justification was to prevent plaintiffs from
161. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
162. Brian Philip Murray, Lifting the PSLRA "Automatic Stay" of Discovery, 80 N.D. L. REv.
405, 407 & n.19 (2004).
163. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (3) (B). The term "particularized dis-
covery" modifies both the terms "preserve evidence" and "undue prejudice." Mishkin v.
Ageloff, 220 B.R. 784, 792-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
164. In re Thornburg Mortg., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CIV 07-0815 JB/WVDS, 2010 WL
2977620, at *6 (D.N.M.July 1, 2010).
165. See Brian P. Murray & Sharon Lee, The Automatic Stay' of Discovery, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 3,
2003, at 4.
166. See Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of
the PSLRA's Internal-Information Standard on '33 and '34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 537, 582
(1998) ("Despite their voluminous discovery requests to defendants, plaintiffs have very little
to offer in the form of reciprocal discovery . . .. [I]n the average securities case, the plain-
tiffs' document production consists solely of trading slips . . . ."). This asymmetry is not
unique to securities litigation. See, e.g., Eric P. Mandel & Mitchell J. Rapp, E-Discovery Align-
ment in Antitrust Actions: Good hIea?, LAw360 (Sept. 17, 2010), http://www.law360.com/
articles/192265/print?section=competition ("Defendants in civil class action antitrust cases
are producing the vast majority of discovery.").
167. H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 37 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 736; see also THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK SECURITIES LITI-
GATION COMMITTEE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON USE OF CONFIDENTIAL SoURCES, DIALOGUE ON THE
CURRENT LAW AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM ON THE USE OF INFORMATION FROM AND THE
DISCLOSURE OF THE IDENTITY OF INFORMANTS 17-18 (2009), available at http://www.nycbar.
org/pdf/report/uploads/20071798-UseofConfidentialSources.pdf ("The legislative history
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commencing securities litigation to conduct discovery in the hopes
of uncovering a sustainable claim.
The PSLRA's stay applies equally to discovery of parties and non-
parties'"6 and whether the litigation has been commenced by indi-
vidual plaintiffs or as a class."17  The stay applies where plaintiffs
have asserted only federal securities law claims or pendent state law
claims in conjunction with federal securities law claims, 7 ' but not
where plaintiffs have asserted only state law claims in federal court
pursuant to diversity jurisdiction.'7 ' The stay applies in shareholder
derivative actions that allege violations of federal law'7 3 and to state
law derivative claims over which the federal court has asserted
shows that Congress recognized that even weak cases surviving a motion to dismiss often
resulted in coercive settlements because of the prohibitive cost of discovery .... Once a
motion is denied, discovery moves forward and cases often acquire a settlement value re-
gardless of the merits of the claim."). (The foregoing report includes separate sections
written by plaintiffs' counsel and defense counsel. The foregoing quotation is taken from
the plaintiffs' section). But cf. John P. Wunderlich, Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.: The
Weighing Game, 39 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 613, 655, 658 (2008) ("[T]he actual costs of discovery
have been sparsely quantified in empirical studies .. .. [A]vailable hard data suggests that
discovery abuse is not rampant, but the misperception of it is.").
168. In re Thornburg Mortg., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CIV 07-0815 JB/S)DS, 2010 WL
2977620, at*6 (D.N.M.July 1, 2010).
169. Faulkner v. Verizon Communc., Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 384, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Pow-
ers v. Eichen, 961 F. Supp. 2d 233, 235 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 1997). But see In reFlir Sys., Inc. Sec.
Litig., No. Civ. 00-360-HA, 2000 ArL 33201904 (D. Or. Dec. 13, 2000) (permitting plaintiffs to
depose former employee of defendant in attempt to bolster their § 10(b) claim). Rir has been
questioned by several courts. See, e.g., Faulkner, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 403-04.
170. Band v. Ginn Companies, LLC, No. 3:09-cv-792-J-25TEM, 2011 WL 807396, at *3
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2011); Lindner v. American Express Co., No. 10 Civ. 2228(JSR)(JLC),
2010 WL 4537819, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2010); Schnall v. Proshares Trust, No. 10 Civ.
3042(JGK), 2010 WL 1962940, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2010).
171. SG Cowan Sec. Corp. v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., 189 F.3d 909,
913 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999); Winer Family Trust v. Queen, No. Civ.A. 03-4318, 2004 WL 350181,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2004) ("[N]umerous courts have held that the PSLRA stay on discov-
ery is applicable to pendent state law claims.").
172. See Koock v. Sugar & Felsenthal, LLP, No. 8:09-CV-609-T-17EAJ, 2009 WL 2579307
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 2009) (refusing to stay discovery where plaintiffs asserted only state law
claims); Hillis v. Heineman, No. CV-09-73-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 798872, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar.
25, 2009); Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., No. 1:02CV157, 1:02CV370, 1:02CV382, 2002 WiL
32121836, at *4 (N.D. Ohio May 16, 2002) (stating that relief from stay is warranted if diver-
sity jurisdiction exists and Congressional policies behind PSLRA would not be furthered by
maintaining stay); Tobias Holding, Inc. v. Bank United Corp., 177 F. Supp. 2d 162 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (noting that stay does not apply to non-fraud state law claims unrelated to plaintiffs
federal securities fraud claims). But cf Angell Investments, L.L.C. v. Purizer Corp., No. 01 C
6359, 2001 WL 1345996 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2001) (indicating that stay applies to state law
claims, even if jurisdiction is based on diversity, if factual bases for federal and state law
claims are closely tied together); Trump Hotel Shareholder Derivative. Litig., No. 96 Civ.
7820 (DAB)(HBP), 1997 WL 442135, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 1997) (noting that exercise of
diversityjurisdiction does not preclude application of stay to state law claims).
173. See, e.g., In reAltera Corp. Derivative Litig., No. C 06-03447JW, 2006 WL 2917578
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2006).
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supplemental jurisdiction,1 7 ' but not to derivative actions asserting
solely state law claims.'5
The stay is mandatory absent application of one of two statuto-
ry exceptions. Thus, according to a majority of courts, if a motion
to dismiss by any defendant is pending or even contemplated,' 6
discovery (expedited or otherwise) is stayed for the entire case,
even if some defendants have already filed answers or had their
motions to dismiss denied.1 7 7 This includes motions to dismiss
174. In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Derivative Litig., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1180 (C.D.
Cal. 2008).
175. See In re First Bancorp Derivative Litig., 407 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re
Firstenergy S'holder Derivative Litig., 219 F.R.D. 584, 586 (N.D. Ohio 2004); In re Tyco Int'l
Ltd. Multidistrict Litig., MDL No. 02-1335-B, 2003 WL 23830479, at *3 (D.N.H. Jan. 29,
2003). Plaintiff shareholders have sometimes attempted to circumvent the PSLRA stay by
pursuing their statutory right to inspect the books and records of the defendant corporation
under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, ostensibly to investigate a
possible derivative suit relating to the same core facts present in the parallel federal suit. 8
DEL. C. § 220; Joseph M. McLaughlin, Delaware Records Inspection Litigation and U.S. Securities
Law, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 9, 2009, at 5. In Beiser v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., the court held that when the
Section 220 action seeks records that would be discoverable in a pending federal securities
action and the shareholder or counsel making the records demand is a party to the federal
action or assisting a party to the federal action, the Section 220 action may not be pursued
unless the party or counsel signs a confidentiality agreement ensuring that any materials
produced in the Section 220 action will not be used in the federal action. CIV. A. 3893-VCL,
2009 WL 483321 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2009).
176. Courts have reached different conclusions about whether the PSLRA's discovery
stay applies before a motion to dismiss has been filed. The majority and better-reasoned view
is that the stay is triggered by any defendant's indication of intent to file a motion to dismiss.
See Friedman v. Quest Energy Partners LP, Nos. CIV-08-936-M, CIV-08-968-M, 2009 WL
5065690, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 15, 2009); Spears v. Metro. Life Ins., No. 2:07-CV-00088-
RL-PRC, 2007 AL 1468697, at *3 (N.D. Ind. May 17, 2007); Sedona Corp. v. Ladenburg
Thalmann, No. 03 Civ. 3120 LTSTHK, 2005 WL 2647945, at *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2005)
("There is no dispute that the PSLRA stay of discovery applies when an initial motion to
dismiss is contemplated, but has not yet been filed.").
177. See Lane v. Page, No. CIV 06-1071 JB/ACT, 2009 WL 1312896, at *1 (D.N.M. Feb.
9, 2009) ("The result may be harsh, but Congress has clearly expressed a desire that discov-
ery not proceed in any securities litigation the PSLRA covers until all pending motions to
dismiss have been resolved."); Sedona Corp. v. Ladenburg Thalmann, No. 03 Civ. 3120
LTSTHK, 2005 WL 2647945, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2005); Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., No.
1:02CV157, 1:02CV370, 1:02CV382, 2002 WL 32121836, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 16, 2002)
(explaining that stay applies "even as to discovery against co-defendants who have not filed
motions to dismiss"); Jeff G. Hammel & RobertJ. Malionek, Some Courts: PSLRA Stay-Provision
Language Ambiguous, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 2006, at 4. However, there is some dispute about this
point. See Latham v. Stein, Civ. Action Nos. 6:08-2995-RBH, 6:08-3183-RBH, 2010 WL
3294722 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2010) (rejecting argument that all discovery must be stayed during
pendency of any motion to dismiss filed in a case); In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 214
F. Supp. 2d 100, 105 (D. Mass. 2002) (same).
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amended complaints"' and motions for reconsideration of dismis-
sal motions.179
B. SLUSA
Three years after the PSLRA was enacted, Congress reinforced
the mandatory stay by enacting the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA).so SLUSA's primary objective was
to federalize class action securities litigation. In the immediate
post-PSLRA years, Congress perceived, not necessarily accurately,
that plaintiffs were circumventing the Act. Plaintiffs were suspected
of evading the PSLRA's strict pleading requirements 8' and discov-
ery stay by asserting state law theories such as common law fraud,
and increasingly filing such claims in state court.8 2 SLUSA amend-
ed the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)'8 3 and the Securities
178. Selbst v. McDonald's Corp., No. 04 C 2422, 2006 WL 566450, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
1, 2006). Cf Beach v. Healthways, Inc., Nos. 3-08-0569, 3-08-0666, 2010 WL 145775 (M.D.
Tenn. Jan. 8, 2010) (holding that PSLRA discovery stay does not apply during pendency of
renewed motion for class certification); In re Salomon Analyst Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 252
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding PSLRA discovery stay applies to renewed motions to dismiss).
179. McGuire v. Dendreon Corp., No. C07-800-MJP, 2009 'WL 666863, (W.D. Wash.
Mar. 11, 2009); Powers v. Eichen, 961 F. Supp. 2d 233, 235-36 (S.D. Cal. 1997). The stay
does not apply to discovery determining the arbitrability of claims. See Sussex v. Turnber-
ry/MGM Grand Towers, LLC, No. 2:08-cv-00773-RLH-PAL, 2011 WL 383793, at *2 (D. Nev.
Feb. 3, 2011).
180. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a
(2000)).
181. The PSLRA imposed two distinct pleading requirements, both of which must be
met in order for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss. The complaint must specify
each allegedly misleading statement, why the statement was misleading, and, if an allegation
is made on information and belief, "all facts" supporting that belief with particularity. In
addition, the complaint must, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate the
securities laws, state with particularity facts giving rise to a "strong inference" that the partic-
ular defendant acted with the requisite state of mind. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (1) and (2).
182. See Demings v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 593 F.3d 486, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2010)
("Congress found that 'plaintiffs and their representatives began bringing class actions un-
der state law, often in state court,' thus subverting the purpose of PSLRA."); H.R. Rep. No.
105-803, at 11 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that decline in the level of federal class action
securities litigation had been matched by an almost equal increase in the level of state court
activity). This perception persists, in the courts and elsewhere. See, e.g., Anderson v. Merrill
Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 521 F.3d 1278, 1280 (10th Cir. 2008); Spielman v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 332 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 2003). However, the accura-
cy of this perception is subject to considerable dispute. See Richard W. Painter, Responding to
a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
9 nn.31-33 (1998) (reviewing studies contradicting findings presented to Congress concern-
ing federal flight); William B. Snyder, Jr., Comment, The Securities Act of 1933 After SLUSA:
Federal Class Actions Belong in Federal Court, 85 N.C. L. REv. 669, 696 n.183 (2007) (noting
debate about existence of so-called "federal flight").
183. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
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Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)'8" in substantially identical
ways,'5 precluding "covered class actions" 1 6 based upon the statutory
or common law of any state where the actions involve allegations of
untrue statements or omissions of material fact' 7 in connection with
the purchase or sale'"8 of a "covered security,"' or allegations that
the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive de-
vice or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a
covered security."' Under SLUSA, such class actions are removable
to federal court and subject to dismissal.'9'
SLUSA also authorizes federal courts to stay discovery proceed-
ings in any private securities action in state court (class actions or
not)'92 in aid of their exercise ofjurisdiction. ' The Seventh Circuit
has noted that the purpose of a discovery stay under SLUSA "is to
prevent settlement extortion-using discovery to impose asymmet-
ric costs on defendants in order to force a settlement advantageous
to the plaintiff regardless of the merits of his suit."'9 4 In determin-
ing whether to stay state court discovery, relevant considerations
include the risk of federal plaintiffs obtaining the state plaintiffs'
discovery, the extent of factual and legal overlap between the ac-
184. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
185. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 n.6 (2006).
186. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f) (5) (B) (defining "covered class action" as, inter alia, actions
in which damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons or prospective class mem-
bers and common questions of law or fact predominate).
187. Non-fraud-based claims are precluded by SLUSA if they incorporate by reference
allegations of false or misleading statements. Levinson v. PSCC Servs., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-
00269, 2009 WL 5184363, at *13 (D. Conn. Dec. 23, 2009).
188. The Supreme Court has held that the "in connection with" requirement must be
read expansively. It suffices that the fraud alleged coincides with a securities transaction,
whether by the plaintiff or someone else. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 85; see also Appert v. Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., No. 08-CV-7130, 2009 WL 3764120, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2009)
("Post-Dabit, courts have consistently found SLUSA preemption applicable to broker-dealer
claims based on allegations of deception or material omissions or misrepresentations con-
cerning transaction fees, even where plaintiffs had painstakingly avoided alleging fraud.").
189. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(E) (2006) (defining "covered security" as one that is
traded nationally and listed on a regulated national exchange, such as the New York Stock
Exchange, NASDAQ, or the American Stock Exchange).
190. Securities Act § 16(b); Exchange Act § 28(f) (1).
191. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2006); Romano v. Kazacos, 609 F.3d 512, 518 (2d Cir. 2010).
SLUSA also amended the jurisdiction and anti-removal provision of the Securities Act to
make state court jurisdiction concurrent with federal jurisdiction except with respect to
covered class actions, and amended the removal bar so that covered class actions involving
covered securities may be removed. See 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2006); Kenneth I. Schacter &
Mary Gail Gearns, Removing '33 Act Class Actions Under SLUSA and CAFA, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 1,
2008, at S7.
192. Buettgen v. Harless, Nos. 3:09-CV-0791-K, 3:09-CV-0938-K, 3:09-CV-1049-K, 2010
WI 2573463, at *1 (N.D. Tex.June 25, 2010).
193. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(D) (2006).
194. Am. Bank v. City of Menasha, 627 F.3d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 2010); Thorogood v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 624 F.3d 842, 848-51 (7th Cir. 2010).
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tions, and the burden of state court discovery on defendants."5
SLUSA's legislative history specifies that the stay provision is to be
used "liberally" by courts.'" Accordingly, SLUSA stays have general-
ly been granted at defendants' request.17
C. Exceptions to the PSLRA Stay
1. Particularized Discovery Is Necessary to Preserve Evidence
There are two statutory exceptions to the PSLRA's mandatory
stay and both of them have been interpreted narrowly by federal
courts. The first is when particularized discovery is necessary to
preserve evidence. This exception presents a high hurdle for
plaintiffs to clear. Congress itself cited a single viable example of
required preservation: the deposition of a terminally ill witness,"-) a
situation that was already covered by the FRCP.'"9 Other scenarios
will not clear the statutory hurdle. For example, the risk of docu-
ment destruction is likely not enough to convince a court to lift the
stay, given the possibility of civil and criminal sanctions and the less
costly alternative of an order prohibiting destruction.200 In order to
satisfy the standard, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the loss of
evidence is imminent and not merely speculative. 20' Accordingly,
195. In re Regions Morgan Keegan Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., Nos. 07-02830, MDL
2009, 2010 WL 596444, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 16, 2010); In re Dot Hill Sys. Corp. Sec. Litig.,
594 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1165 (S.D. Cal. 2008); In re Crompton Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 3:03-cv-
1293 (EBB), 2005 WL 3797695, at *3 (D. Conn. July 22, 2005).
196. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-640, at 17-18 (1998).
197. See Matthew L. Mustokoff, Shareholder Discovery, the PSLRA and SLUSA in Parallel
Securities and Derivative Actions, 35 SEC. REG. L.J. 143, 144 (2006).
198. H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-369, at 31, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 736.
199. SeeFED. R. Civ. P. 27.
200. Gary L. Cutler, PSLRA Stay Does Not Always Halt the Process, N.Y.L.J., June 19, 2006,
at S8, S9. In addition, the PSLRA protects against document destruction by requiring parties
to treat evidence in their custody or under their control as if it were the subject of a continu-
ing discovery request while the stay is in place. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (3) (C)(i); In re
Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., No. 02 MDL 1484(MP), 01 CV 6881 (MP),
2004 WL 305601, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2004) (refusing to lift stay because defendants
avowed they had taken all necessary steps to preserve all potentially relevant electronic evi-
dence); In re: CFS-Related Sec. Fraud Litig., AUSA v. Bartmann, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1265
(N.D. Okla. 2001) (refusing to lift stay where motions to dismiss had been pending for more
than one year, on basis that such a delay failed to establish significant risk of evidence loss);
In re Carnegie Int'l Corp. Sec. Litig., 107 F. Stipp. 2d 676, 684 (D. Md. 2000). But see Konce-
lik v. Savient Pharm., Inc., No. 08 Civ. 10262(GEL), 2009 WL 2448029, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
10. 2009) (partially lifting stay to permit service of document preservation subpoenas).
201. Band v. Ginn Cos., No. 3:09-cv-792-J-25TEM, 2011 WL 807396, at *2 (M.D. Fla.
Mar. 2, 2011); In reVivendi Universal, S.A., Sec. Litig., 381 F. Supp. 2d 129, 130 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). In In re Royal Ahold N. V. Sec. & EIUSA Litig., 220 F.R.D. 246, 251 (D. Md. 2004), the
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the mere fact that a defendant debtor corporation faces possible
liquidation or reorganization does not suffice to establish
imminent document destruction.202 If the subject documents have
already been produced, courts usually find no risk of loss.20
2. Particularized Discovery Is Necessary to
Prevent Undue Prejudice
Plaintiffs are only marginally more successful with the second
statutory exception to the mandatory stay, where particularized
discovery is necessary to prevent undue prejudice to the party seek-
ing relief. The requirement of particularized discovery has been
accurately described by several courts as "nebulous"204 and courts
have differed greatly in their definitions of a particularized discov-
ery request under the PSLRA.2 0 Moreover, neither the statute nor
the legislative history indicates what may constitute "undue preju-
dice." In the absence of statutory and legislative guidance, the
majority of federal courts considering the issue have construed the
standard to require plaintiffs seeking relief from the stay to show
exceptional circumstances involving improper or unfair treatment,
amounting to something less than irreparable harm.206
court lifted the stay because a wide-ranging corporate re-organization involving divestitures
of key subsidiaries created a reasonable concern that documents might be lost.
202. In re Colonial BancGroup, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 2:09cv104-MHT, 2009 WL 4585928,
at *2 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 2, 2009).
203. See, e.g., In reXWilliams Sec. Litig., No. 02-CV-72H(M), 2003 WL 22013464, at *1-2
(N.D. Okla. May 22, 2003); In re Vivendi, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 130. Courts have been somewhat
more willing to partially lift the stay to permit discovery from third parties and thereby pre-
serve evidence that might otherwise be destroyed. See, e.g., In re Tyco Int'l, Sec. Litig., No.
00MD1335, 2000 WL 33654141, at *3 (D.N.H. July 27, 2000) (partially lifting stay to permit
third-party subpoenas, after plaintiffs produced evidence that "large corporations typically
overwrite and thereby destroy electronic data in the course of performing routine backup
procedures."); In re Grand Casinos, Inc. Sec. Litig., 988 F. Supp. 1270, 1272-73 (D. Minn.
1997) (lifting stay to permit service of third party document preservation subpoenas).
204. Winer Family Trust v. Queen, No. Civ.A. 03-4318, 2004 WL 350181, at *6 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 6, 2004) (quoting Mishkin v. Ageloff, 220 B.R. 784, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
205. In re Spectranetics Corp. Sec. Litig., Civ. Action Nos. 08-cv-02048-REB-KLM, 08-cv-
02055-CMA-CBS, 08-cv-02078-MSK-BNB, 08-cv--02267-MSK-CBS, 08-cv-02420-PAB, 08-
cv-02603-MSK-BNB, 2009 WL 3346611, at *2 (D. Colo. Oct. 14, 2009). A request is not
particularized when it covers all documents that would be discoverable in a non-PSLRA case.
Id.
206. See, e.g., Ohio Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Fed. Home Loan Mort. Corp., No.
4:08CV0160, 2010 WL 1628059, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 22, 2010); Brigham v. Royal Bank of
Can., No. 08 CV 4431(WHP), 2009 IL 935684, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2009); In re Smith
Barney Transfer Agent Litig., No. 05 Civ. 7583(WHP), 2006 WL 1738078, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
June 26, 2006). Cf Sara S. Gold & Richard L. Spinogatti, Are the PSLRA Discovery Stay Excep-
tions Swallowing the Rule?, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 9, 2009, at 1 ("Although the majority of federal
district courts appear to have required 'unique' or 'exceptional' circumstances to exist be-
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Undue prejudice does not arise from a delay in the collection of
evidence or the development of settlement or litigation postures,
217
because such delay is inherent in every mandatory PSLRA stayo
Plaintiffs have found some success when defendants are insolvent:
in several cases, courts have found undue prejudice and lifted the
208
stay, reasoning that because multiple parties were competing for
shares of a limited settlement fund, class action plaintiffs would be
at a serious disadvantage without the requested discovery.o20
The most common basis for a claim of undue prejudice is the
existence of parallel litigation or criminal or regulatory investiga-
tions that require class action defendants to produce documents to
other plaintiffs, the government, or an investigating entity.20 Paral-
lel investigations are common.2 1' Notwithstanding their frequency,
or in part because of it, plaintiffs seeking modification of the
PSLRA's mandatory stay to obtain documents produced to
fore permitting an exception to the discovery stay, as the PSLRA appears to require, a signif-
icant minority of courts seem [sic] to have strayed from the plain language of the provision
to permit discovery without exceptional circumstances[.]").
207. Brigham, 2009 WIL 935684, at *1; In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05 Civ.
8626(GEL), 2006 WL 2337212, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2006). But cf Vacold LLC v. Cerami,
No. 00 CIV. 4024(AGS), 2001 WIHL 167704, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2001) (finding undue
prejudice and lifting stay); Global Intellicom, Inc. v. Thomson Kernaghan & Co., No. 99 CIV
342(DLC), 1999 WL 223158, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1999) (finding undue prejudice where
stay might prevent plaintiff from seeking redress for alleged violations).
208. See, e.g., In re Delphi Corp., MDL No. 1725, 2007 WH.L 518626, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Feb.
15, 2007) (lifting stay where plaintiffs would be left without a settlement if their class action
litigation did not keep pace with bankruptcy and SEC actions); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 234 F. Supp. 2d 301, 305-06 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (lifting stay where defendants were insol-
vent and other investigations and proceedings were "moving apace"); In re Enron Corp. Sec.,
Derivative. & ERISA Litig., No. 01-3642, 2002 AIL 31845114, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2002).
Cf Singer v. Nicor, No. 02 C 5168, 2003 WIL 22013905, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2003) (reject-
ing defendants' attempt to distinguish Enron and WorldCom).
209. See In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 220 F.R.D. 246, 252 (D. Md. 2004);
In re WorldCom, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 305-06. But cf Friedman v. Quest Energy Partners LP,
Nos. CIV-08-936-M, CIV-08-968-M, 2009 HL 5065690 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 15, 2009) (refusing to
lift stay because allegations that defendants' future as going concerns was not guaranteed
were speculative).
210. Debra M. Torres, PSLRA Mandatory Stay Can Be Heavy Lifting, N.Y.L.J., June 18,
2007, at S6. Another basis for a claim of undue prejudice is where discovery is necessary to
resolve the issue of class certification. See Taddeo v. Am. Invsco Corp., No. 2:08-CV-01463-
KJD-RJJ, 2011 L2531141 (D. Nev.June 24, 2011).
211. For example, during the period 2006-2010, 188 federal securities class action fil-
ings had some form of involvement by the SEC, including formal or informal investigations,
109 filings had some form of involvement by the United States Department ofJustice (DOJ),
including investigations, and 74 filings had both SEC and DOJ involvement. GRACE LAMONT
& NEILL KEENAN, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2010 SECURITIEs LITIGATION STUDY 32-33
(2011), available at http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/NY-11-0484%20SEC%20LIT%2OSTUDY-
V6BONLINE.pdf.
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government regulators and investigators usually fail.1  District
courts presented with applications for modification have typically,
but not always, concluded that undue prejudice has not been
demonstrated.1 Courts have refused to lift the stay while simulta-
neously acknowledging that granting plaintiffs' applications would
not frustrate the PSLRA's goals. Specifically, district courts have
212. See, e.g., Kuriakose v. Fed. Home Loan Mort. Co., 674 F. Supp. 2d 483 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (refusing to lift stay where about 400,000 documents were produced by the lead de-
fendant during active investigations conducted by the SEC, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and
the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform). The court stated: "Contrary
to Plaintiffs' assertion, courts do not routinely lift the PSLRA discovery stay when the re-
quested documents have already been provided to government investigators." Id. at 487;
accord In re Sunrise Senior Living, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 14, 18 (D.D.C. 2008) (refusing to lift
discovery stay in part because "an SEC investigation occurring contemporaneously with
private litigation is not at all an uncommon occurrence . . . ."). But see In re WorldCom, 234 F.
Supp. 2d at 301; In re Enron Sec., Derivative. & ERISA Litig., No. Civ. A H-01-3624, 2002 WL
31845114 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2002). In both of those high-profile cases, the stay was lifted
with respect to documents that had already been produced to the government by insolvent
defendants. The stay also was partially lifted in the high-profile securities class action litiga-
tion involving Bank of America's acquisition of Merrill Lynch, permitting discovery of
documents produced in active investigations by the SEC, Congress, the New York Attorney
General, and the North Carolina Attorney General. See In re Bank of Am. Corp. Sec., Deriva-
tive & ERISA Litig., No. 09 MDL 2058(DC), 2009 HAIL 4796169 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2009);
Susan Beck, Key Ruling in BofA Securities Class Action Gives Plaintiffs Access to Treasure Trove of
Documents, LAw.COM, Nov. 11, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendlyjsp?
id=1202435619585.
213. See, e.g., In re Spectranetics Corp. Sec. Litig., Nos. 08-cv-02048-REB-KLM, 08-cv-
02055-CMA-CBS, 08-cv-02078-MSK-BNB, 08-cv-02267-MSK-CBS, 08-cv-02420-PAB, 08-
cv-02603-MSK-BNB, 2009 WL 3346611, at *7 (D. Colo. Oct. 14, 2009) (refusing to find
undue prejudice where three of five referenced regulatory bodies were not actively
proceeding against defendant); In re Merck & Co., Inc. Vytorin/Zetia Sec. Litig., No. 08-
2177, 2009 WL 1456615 (D.N.J. May 22, 2009); In re Schering-Plough Corp./Enhance Sec.
Litig., No. 08-397, 2009 WL 1470453 (D.N.J. May 22, 2009); In re Asyst Tec., Inc. Derivative.
Litig., No. C-06-04669 EDL, 2008 'I. 916883 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2008). The stay was lifted in
Waldman v. Wachovia Corp., No. 08 Civ. 2913(SAS), 2007 WL 86763, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12,
2009), a class action involving the underwriting, marketing, and sale of auction rate securi-
ties. Such securities are bonds or preferred stock with interest or dividend rates established
by periodic auctions. In Waldman, the Court concluded that maintaining a discovery stay
with regard to documents already produced to state and federal authorities would unduly
prejudice plaintiffs because the documents could help resolve plaintiffs' decision whether to
pursue the case. Id. The stay was not lifted in the same federal district in at least two other
class actions involving auction rate securities, based on the same arguments raised in Wald-
man. See Brigham v. Royal Bank of Can., No. 08 CV 4431 (WHP), 2009 WL 935684, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2009); In re UBS Auction Rate Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2967(LMM), 2008
WL 5069060, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2008). Likewise, the stay was not lifted in a different
federal district, in a class action involving auction rate securities. See Zisholtz v. SunTrust
Banks, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-1287-TWT, 2009 WIL 3132907, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 24, 2009). As
mentioned supra, in order to lift the stay, plaintiffs must show both the existence of undue
prejudice and that their discovery requests are sufficiently particularized. Courts disagree
about whether a request is sufficiently particular if it is limited to documents already pro-
duced to the government. At least two courts have answered that question in the negative.
See In re Am. Funds Sec. Litig., 493 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2007); In re Fannie Mae Sec.
Litig., 362 F. Supp. 2d 37, 39 (D.D.C. 2005).
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refused to lift the stay where parallel SEC or DOJ investigations
have revealed that plaintiffs' claims may be meritorious. Courts
have rejected the argument that the PSLRA's policy goal of pre-
venting plaintiffs from filing frivolous strike suits would not be
thwarted under such circumstances. 14 No federal appellate court
had considered the issue as of mid-2011.
The outcome with respect to parallel litigation has been mixed.
Courts occasionally accept the argument that, whereas the primary
function of the stay is to eliminate the high cost of discovery before
the potential merits of a securities fraud case are assessed, the cost
is sharply reduced when defendants have already found, reviewed,
and organized the requested documents in parallel litigation.m
Courts likewise sometimes accept this argument if the plaintiff of-
fers to pay the defendant's costs to produce the documents. Other
courts disagree.m
Overall, with some isolated exceptions, plaintiffs have generally
been unsuccessful in their efforts to lift the PSLRA's mandatory
stay of discovery. The results are similar even when a confidentiality
agreement is present. In several cases, plaintiffs have asked the
court for orders limiting the scope of confidentiality agreements
signed by former employees of defendants, and/or lifting the dis-
covery stay, to permit the former employees to be interviewed by
plaintiffs' counsel. Defendants have argued in response that such
motions are encompassed by the PSLRA's stay of "all discovery and
other proceedings," which includes witness interviews.2' While
nothing in the PSLRA prohibits interviewing prospective witnesses,
and the Act's elevated pleading standard "encourages plaintiffs to
214. See, e.g., Brigham, 2009 WL 935684, at *2 ("[Tihe mere fact that the PSLRA's goals
would not be frustrated ... is not sufficient to warrant lifting the stay." (quoting 308544
Can., Inc. v. Aspen Tech., No. 07 Civ. 1204(JFK), 2007 WL 2049738, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 18,
2007))); see also In re Spectranetics, 2009 WIL 3346611, at *8 ("Although courts may consider
whether policies behind the PSLRA discovery stay are frustrated by lifting that stay ... noth-
ing in the statute requires such a consideration nor allows an exception to the stay based
merely on policy considerations.").
215. See, e.g., Westchester Putnam Heavy & Highway Laborers Local 60 Benefit Fund v.
Sadia S.A., No. 08 Civ. 9528(SAS), 2009 ML 1285845, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2009) (partially
lifting stay to permit discovery of investigative report produced in parallel litigation the day
after plaintiffs respond to defendants' motion to dismiss); In re LeBranche Sec. Litig., 333 F.
Supp. 2d 178,183 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
216. See In re Sunrise, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 17 ("[T]he ease with which the defendant can
produce the documents is not the standard for assessing whether a discovery request is
particularized[.]"); Ross v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., Nos. 2:05-cv-0819, 2:05-cv-0848, 2:05-cv-
0860, 2:05-cv-0879, 2:05-cv-0893, 2:05-cv-0913, 2:05-cv-0959, 2:05-cv-0964, 2:05-cv-0998, 2:05-
cv-1084, 2006 WL 2869588, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 5, 2006).
217. See In reJDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1134 (N.D. Cal.
2002); 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(b) (3) (B).
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do more investigation before filing a complaint, not less," 218 several
district courts have refused to lift the stay and permit interviews of
former employees bound by confidentiality agreements.219
D. Salutary Effects of the PSLRA Stay
The PSLRA discovery stay has achieved its two primary objec-
tives. Thus, its record of success suggests that an extension of the
stay to all federal civil litigation would be beneficial. Extension of
the stay to preclude e-discovery during the pendency of motions to
dismiss would achieve a number of benefits. A mandatory stay
would result in significant cost savings by deferring e-discovery un-
til after meritless claims are dismissed. Cost savings will be greatest
where complaints are dismissed with no leave to amend, but sav-
ings will also result from partial dismissals that narrow the claims
and scope of relevant discovery. A narrowed scope of discovery will
result in fewer and less costly discovery disputes. The Federal Judi-
cial Center found that each reported type of dispute over ESI
increased a party's overall litigation costs by 10 percent, controlling
for other factors. This was true for both plaintiffs' and defendants'
reported costs. 220 Fewer disputes will translate to lower litigation
costs for both plaintiffs and defendants. The judicial system will
benefit from an increased level of efficiency, as discovery disputes
diminish.
218. In reJDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
219. See, e.g., In re Spectrum Brands, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:05-cv-02494-WSD, 2007 WL
1483633, at *5 (N.D. Ga. May 18, 2007). But see In re First Horizon Pharm. Corp. Sec. Litig.,
No. 1:02-cv-2332 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2003) (Order available on Pacer at https://ecf.gand.
uscourts.gov/docl/0551331754) (granting relief to plaintiffs where defendant sent threat-
ening reminder letters about confidentiality agreements to potential witnesses, thus chilling
their willingness to speak); In reJDS Uniphase, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (hold-
ing that confidentiality agreements did not prohibit former employees from responding to
interview questions, because such agreements conflict with public policy in favor of allowing
current employees to assist in securities fraud investigations); Anderson v. First Sec. Corp.,
157 F. Supp. 2d 1230 (D. Utah 2001) (lifting stay where confidentiality agreement prevented
plaintiffs from obtaining specific information prior to filing complaint); see also In re Flir Sys.,
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. Civ. 00-360-HA, 2000 Wi 33201904 (D. Or. Dec. 13, 2000) (permitting
plaintiffs to depose former employee of defendant in attempt to bolster their § 10(b)
claim). In the parallel context of government investigations, neither current nor former
employees are bound by confidentiality agreements that restrict their ability to provide in-
formation concerning misconduct to investigators. See, e.g., SEC v. Lipson, No. C 2661, 1997
WL 801712 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 1997).
220. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, LITIGATION COSTS IN CIVIL CASES:
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS-REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONF. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL
RULES 5, 7 (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv1.pdf/
$file/costcivl.pdf.
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A mandatory stay will also significantly reduce front-loaded dis-
covery costs and decrease the coercive pressure that defendants
face to settle cases prior to disposition of motions to dismiss. The
reduced pressure to settle has been observed in securities litigation
following the enactment of the PSLRA"' and a similar reduction
122can be expected in other civil litigation.
Finally, a stay is likely to decrease the incidence of frivolous civil
litigation: research establishes that frivolous securities litigation has
declined since the passage of the PSLRA.2 5 This decline should be
mirrored in non-securities cases.
In short, the same policies that justified adoption of the PSLRA
stay justify extension of that stay to e-discovery in all federal civil
cases. Given the significant potential benefits, it is unsurprising
that support among attorneys for a stay is high. In a 2010 survey of
403 senior corporate counsels, 79 percent of the respondents
agreed that the FRCP should be modified to limit e-discovery in
civil actions." In addition, a clear majority of the more than 3,300
attorneys surveyed in a 2009 ABA Report agreed that there should
be an automatic stay of discovery in all cases, pending determina-
225tion of a threshold motion to dismiss.
V. TWOMBLY AND IQBAL
Enactment of a mandatory stay of e-discovery during the pen-
dency of motions to dismiss in all federal civil litigation is likely to
221. See, e.g., Richard H. Walker, David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The New Securi-
ties Class Action: Federal Obstacles, State Detours, 39 ARIz. L. REv. 641, 665 (1997)
("[D]efendants [in securities fraud class action litigation] are now extremely reluctant to
settle before a motion to dismiss has been decided.").
222. See EFFECTIVE REFORM, supra note 10, at 30 ("An automatic stay [of discovery]
would greatly reduce the in terrorem value of lawsuits.. .. "); Michael H. Gruenglas, Robert A.
Fumerton & Patrick G. Rideout, A Proposal to Prevent Blackmail at the Pleading Stage--Stay Dis-
covery Pending Motions to Dismiss, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 5, 2009, at 1 ("By deferring all e-discovery until
after the legal sufficiency of a complaint has been tested, plaintiffs will no longer be able to
use frivolous lawsuits to extract settlements by holding the prospect of e-discovery over de-
fendants' heads.").
223. See Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act?, 23 J.L. EcoN. & Onc. 598, 623 (2007) (concluding that PSLRA has operated to
reduce incidence of both nuisance litigation and meritorious litigation); see also Beisner,
supra note 117, at 593 ("Because judges must now evaluate the merits of a securities class-
action suit before subjecting a defendant to expensive civil discovery, there is little incentive
for plaintiffs to file frivolous claims.").
224. FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P., SEVENTH ANNUAL LITIGATION TRENDS SURVEY
REPORT 2, 52 (2010), available at http://www.fulbright.com/images/publications/7th
LitigationTrendsReport.pdf.
225. ABA REPORT, supra note 11, at 99.
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have significant salutary effects. But do the benefits outweigh the
costs? The most significant potential cost is preclusion of meritori-
ous litigation. In this regard, it is imperative to consider Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal. In Twombly, decided in
2007, the Supreme Court overruled its fifty-year-old decision in
22'Conley v. Gibson and established a new standard for pleading in
federal court. Conley held that a complaint should not be dismissed
for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief."227 Twombly rewrote that standard in a
7-2 decision. The Supreme Court, confronted with a consumer an-
titrust class action, concluded that Conley was "best forgotten as an
incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard"228
that had "earned its retirement."2 2  Conley's standard was replaced
in Twombly with a requirement that a pleading set forth "enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.230 Two
years later the Supreme Court held in Iqbal that the Twombly plead-
ing standard applies to all civil cases, and not just antitrust cases.231
Neither decision defines plausibility or specifies what factual alle-
gations would comprise a plausible claim.
The Supreme Court's motivation for adopting a stricter pleading
standard was a need to require some level of plausibility "lest a
plaintiff with 'a largely groundless claim' be allowed to 'take up the
time of a number of other people, with the right to do so repre-
senting an in terrorem increment of the settlement value."'" The
Court repeatedly emphasized the high costs of discovery, particularly
226. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
227. Id. at 45-46.
228. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 570.
231. 129 S. Ct. at 1937, 1953-54 (2009). The majority of federal district courts that have
considered the issue have held that Twombly's plausibility standard also applies to affirmative
defenses. Manuel John Dominguez, William B. Lewis & Anne F. O'Berry, The Plausibility
Standard as a Double-Edged Sword: The Application of Twombly and Iqbal to Affirmative Defenses,
84 FLA. B.J. 77, 77 (2010); see also Anthony Gambol, Note, The Twombly Standard and Affirm-
ative Defenses: What is Good for the Goose is Not Always Good for the Gander, 79 FORDHAM L. REV.
2173, 2176 (2011) (noting district court split on this issue).
232. See Mark Moller, Procedure's Ambiguity, 86 IND. L.J. 645, 645 (2011) (noting that
"[flew Supreme Court opinions are as deeply inscrutable" as Twombly and Iqbal); Alexander
A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119, 131 (2011).
233. 550 U.S. at 557-58 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347
(2005)); see also Suja A. Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Employment Discrimination,
2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 215, 219 (2011) ("[H]igh cost and significant asymmetry in costs drove
the new plausibility standard in Twombly.").
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in private securities and antitrust litigation,m and underscored the
"common lament that the success ofjudicial supervision in checking
discovery has been on the modest side."
Twombly and Iqbal have been influential, but probably less so
than many critics have suggested.2 3 6 It is true that Twombly is on-
track to become the most-cited Supreme Court case of all-time,
unless it is surpassed by IqbaL By March 2010, Twombly, already
ranked seventh on the all-time list of most-cited Supreme Court
cases by federal courts and tribunals; Iqbal, decided in 2009, al-
ready ranked seventy-sixth. By comparison, Conley, decided fifty
years before Twombly, ranked fourth.2 37 And Twombly and Iqbal have
228
been the subject of a flood of academic commentary, much of it
negative.2 The two decisions have been criticized on a range of
234. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560 n.6. Private enforcement of the antitrust laws is signifi-
cantly more common than public enforcement. There are approximately ten private federal
cases for each case brought by the DOJ or Federal Trade Commission. Daniel A. Crane,
Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 675, 675-76 (2010). The cost of
discovery in antitrust cases can be enormous. See DSM Desotech Inc., No. 08 CV 1531, 2008
WL 4812440, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2008); Roy W. Breitenbach & Alicia M. Wilson, Manag-
ing the Fact Discovery Tsunami: Tips When Defending a Federal Antitrust Case, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 18,
2011, at S8 ("In complex antitrust disputes, the amount of ESI often is so vast, and the
preservation and production issues so complex, that e-discovery issues quickly spin out of
control and destroy the entire defense budget."). One indicator of the potential scope of
antitrust discovery is that between 2003 and 2008 the DOJ's antitrust division increased its
electronic storage capacity from 12 to 70 TB. TRACY GREER, E-DISCOVERY INITIATIVES AT
THE ANTITRUST DIVIsIoN 1 (2009), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/atr/public/
electronicdiscovery/243194.htm. But cf Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly,
and the Expected Cost of False Positive Error, 20 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 18 & n.84 (2010)
("[In Twombly, t]he Court did not rely on quantitative analysis of discovery expense in anti-
trust suits, which does not appear to exist in current literature.").
235. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 635, 638 (1989)); see also Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-
Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 65, 107 (2010) ("There is no doubt that one of the Supreme Court's primary
rationales for retiring Conley's permissive pleading standard was the Court's desire to reduce
time-consuming, costly, and burdensome discovery.").
236. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 233, at 216 ("[T]he new standard will likely have a
revolutionary impact on cases[.]").
237. Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1293, 1295, 1357 & n.9
(2010); see also Reinert, supra note 232, at 133 n.71 ("At last count, Iqbal had been cited in
more than fourteen thousand decisions, but this does not tell us much about its impact.
After all, most courts are presumably citing Iqbal because it is the most recent Supreme
Court decision addressing pleading.").
238. See Steinman, supra note 237, at 1295-96 & n.10 (listing scholarly commentary).
239. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Sys-
tems, 95 IoWA L. REv. 821, 823 (2010) ("[T]hese decisions do more than redefine pleading
rules. By inventing a new and foggy test for the threshold stage of every lawsuit, they have
destabilized the entire system of civil litigation."); Lisa Eichhorn, A Sense of Disentitlement:
Frame-Shifting and Metaphor in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 62 FLA. L. REV. 951, 959 (2010); Robert D.
Owen & Travis Mock, The Plausibility of Pleading After Twombly and Iqbal, II SEDONA CONF.
L.J. 181, 187 (2010).
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grounds. The primary criticism is that the stricter pleading stand-
ard will significantly increase the incidence of pre-trial dismissals
and thereby restrict access to justice for plaintiffs with meritorious
civil claims.o
To date, however, the empirical evidence does not support the
notion that dismissals have significantly increased.4  In particular,
while a major concern of some critics has been that Twombly and
Iqbal will bar civil rights cases, a March 2011 study by the Admin-
istrative Office of the United States Courts examined the 94 federal
district court dockets and found no significant increase in the dis-
missals of civil rights cases. Twombly was decided in May 2007 and
Iqbal was decided in May 2009. During the pre-Twombly period of
January-March 2007, federal district courts granted 39.58 percent
of motions to dismiss filed in civil rights employment cases. 24 3 Dur-
ing the post-Iqbal period of July 2009-December 2010, federal
district courts granted 37.40 percent of motions to dismiss filed in
civil rights employment cases.4  The results were very similar for
other civil rights cases, which are typically based on statutory causes
of action such as alleged violations of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act24" or the Fair Labor Standards Act.246 During
the pre-Twombly period of January-March 2007, federal district
courts granted 39.54 percent of motions to dismiss that were filed
in such cases. 4 ' During the post-Iqbal period of July 2009-
December 2010, federal district courts granted 37.25 percent of
such motions.4 In short, the percentage of motions to dismiss that
240. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 233, at 216 ("Because the new standard is akin to
summary judgment with much less information, more dismissals are likely to occur at the
motion to dismiss stage.").
241. SeeJohn G. McCarthy, An Early Review oflqbal in the Circuit Courts, 57 FED. L. 36, 36
(2010) ("In most circuits, the application of the pleading requirements expressed in Iqbal to
specific complaints have achieved the same results as would have been reached under
pre-existing case law."); Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the
Modern World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33
HARV.J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 1107, 1145 (2010) ("[T]he limited studies and reports on the im-
pact of Twombly and Jqbal suggest no radical sea change or general denial of access to the
courts for specific groups of plaintiffs.").
242. See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REv. 553, 624 (2010); Alex Reinert, Procedural Barriers to Civil Rights
Litigation and the Illusory Promise of Equity, 78 UMKC L. REv. 931, 931 (2010).
243. See STATISTICS DIvisioN, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
MOTIONS To Dismiss: INFORMATION ON COLLECTION OF DATA 2 (2011) [hereinafter MOTIONS
To Dismiss], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/ruiles/NOS-
Motions%20Quarterly%2ODecember_03161 1.pdf.
244. Id.
245. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1461 (2006).
246. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006).




have been granted in civil rights cases has declined post-Iqbal, as
compared with the pre-Twombly era.
Moreover, the foregoing statistics likely overstate the significance
of post-Iqbal dismissals. They do not reveal whether motions were
granted with or without leave to amend, and, if with leave, whether
the case continued with an amended complaint.249 Other studies
with smaller subsets of data have found more significant increases
in post-Iqbal dismissal rates, but much of the increase is attributable
to grants of motions to dismiss with leave to amend.2 50
The data from the Administrative Office suggest that Twombly
and Iqbal mostly confirmed the historical practice of federal courts.
A December 2010 review of cases applying Twombly and Iqbal con-
cluded that, "the case law to date does not appear to indicate that
Iqbal has dramatically changed the application of the standards
used to determine pleading sufficiency."," Instead, application of
Iqbal has been context-specific. Under this approach, courts apply
the Iqbal analysis more leniently in cases where pleading with more
detail may be difficult. For example, courts have continued to em-
phasize that pro se pleadings"5 are evaluated more leniently than
others, and they continue to find pleading on "information and
belief' to be appropriate when permitted under applicable civil
procedure rules and relevant case law.
Courts also continue to provide leave to amend when motions to
dismiss are granted. Antitrust litigation provides an example: a
249. See id.
250. See, e.g., Hatamyar, supra note 242, at 556 ("[T] he rate at which such motions were
granted increased from Conley to Twombly to Iqbal, although grants with leave to amend ac-
counted for much of the increase."); Cf. Schneider, supra note 9, at 535 ("There are also
numerous employment and civil rights cases in which district courts have granted leave to
amend.").
251. Memorandum from Andrea Kuperman, Rules Law Clerk to Judge Lee H. Rosen-
thal, to Civil Rules Committee and Standing Rules Committee 4 (Dec. 15, 2010)
[hereinafter Kuperman Memorandum], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Iqbalmemo_121510.pdf; see also REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE
BAR ASSOCIATION'S SPECIAL COMIITEE ON PLEADING STANDARDS IN FEDERAL LITIGATION
18 (2010), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu42/Junel92010
HouseofDelegatesMeetingAgendaltems/StandardsforPleadingFinalReport.pdf ("[B]ut for
patent cases, Iqbal has not had an appreciable effect on the percentage of motions to dismiss
that have been granted and denied in the federal courts."); Michael R. Huston, Note, Plead-
ing with Congress to Resist the Urge to Overrule Twombly and Iqbal, 109 MIcH. L. REv. 415, 434
(2010) ("[B]y and large, federal courts are not dismissing more cases following Iqbal.").
252. Pro se pleadings are increasingly common in federal court. See Rory K Schneider,
Comment, Illiberal Construction of Pro Se Pleadings, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 585, 591-93 (2011)
("[Flederal courts have recently experienced a staggering increase in the proportion of pro
se cases on their dockets.. . . Presently, pro se litigants appear in approximately thirty-seven
percent of all federal court cases .... [A]pproximately sixty-two percent of all civil appeals
are presently pursued pro se[.]").
253. Kuperman Memorandum, supra note 251, at 5.
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2010 study found that motions to dismiss were granted post-
Twombly in 65.3 percent of 170 antitrust cases filed in federal
district court. But most of these decisions dismissed the complaint
at issue without prejudice, adjudicated a previously amended com-
plaint, or dismissed the complaint but granted leave to amend.2 54
Similarly, a 2011 study of 264 post-Iqbal decisions resolving disposi-
tive pleading motions (most of which were motions to dismiss) in
pharmaceutical and medical device litigation found that only 5.3
percent of the dismissals were with prejudice, consistent with
pre-Twombly dismissal rates.5 The Federal Judicial Center provided
additional evidence concerning the frequency of grants of leave to
amend in the comprehensive study it released in March 2011. The
study found no post-Twombly increase in motions to dismiss granted
without leave to amend, apart from motions in cases challenging
financial instruments.2 56
The focus by Twombly and Iqbal on the reduction of costly dis-
covery is consistent with this Article's central argument, which is
that e-discovery should be stayed in civil cases pending the resolu-
tion of motions to dismiss. The empirical evidence cited above
shows that those cases have not resulted in a statistically significant
increase in dismissals. However, even if Twombly and Iqbal have not
yet operated to bar access to the federal courts for plaintiffs with
meritorious claims, are they more likely to do so in the future, if
e-discovery is stayed while courts resolve motions to dismiss? Prob-
ably, yes. Research has revealed that the PSLRA, which codified
254. HEATHER LAMBERG KAFELE & MARIO M. MEEKS, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, ANTI-
TRUST DIGEST: DEVELOPING TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN ANTITRUST CASES AFTER Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly AND Ashcroft v. Iqbal 8, 15, (2010), available at http://www.shearman.com/
Antitrust-Digest-04-20-2010/; accord Michael P. Lehmann, Twombly and Antitrust Class Action
Plaintiffs, LAw360 (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/219599/print?section=
competition ("In sum, in many recent major antitrust class actions, while Twombly has some-
times had the effect of lengthening the period in which dismissal motions are considered (and,
on occasion, has necessitated the filing of amended complaints), more often than not, mo-
tions to dismiss were ultimately denied (or sometimes reversed on appeal)."). For an
example of this phenomenon, see In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622 (7th
Cir. 2010) (affirming denial of motion to dismiss second amended complaint in antitrust
class action).
255. William M. Janssen, Iqbal 'Plausibility' in Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Litigation,
71 LA. L. REv. 541, 610-11 (2011). The study concluded: "In short, during the first 15-and-a-
half months after Iqbal, claimants were having roughly the same rate of success in completely
fending off pleading motions in pharmaceutical and medical device cases as all federal
pleaders had before Iqbal (and, indeed, before Twombly)." Id. at 603.
256. SeeJOE S. CECIL, ET AL., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER
IQBAL, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES 13, 21
(2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/
motioniqbal.pdf. This study does not reveal whether complaints were amended following
the grant of leave and, if so, whether the amendments were successful. Id. at 14.
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both a discovery stay and tightened pleading standards, has oper-
ated to bar some mentorous securities claims2" and a similar effect
might well result if a discovery stay is widely applied in civil cases.
While some meritorious claims might be barred, it is likely that
this adverse effect would be limited. First, the proposal set forth
herein does not suggest a stay of all discovery pending resolution
of motions to dismiss. It merely suggests a stay of e-discovery. Un-
der this proposal, the parties would still be permitted to engage in
traditional paper-based discovery, depositions, and physical and
mental examinations, consistent with the FRCP. Moreover, as some
commentators have noted, the decreasing severity of information
asymmetries between plaintiffs and defendants have made infor-
mal methods of investigation cheaper and more effective, thereby
reducing the importance of taking formal discovery prior to the
disposition of motions to dismiss.5 In Twombly, for example,
"much of the information that was relevant to the ultimate disposi-
tion of that case was publicly available to both parties at the outset
of the litigation."
Second, this Article's proposal does not suggest a stay of all e-
discovery. Rather, the two statutorily recognized exceptions to the
mandatory PSLRA stay would be extended to all civil litigation.
Plaintiffs could seek to have the stay lifted if particularized discov-
ery was necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue
prejudice. While it is true that plaintiffs in securities actions have
generally failed to lift stays under either of those exceptions, their
failure is due at least in part to the unduly narrow construction
federal district courts have given to the undue prejudice require-
ment. As indicated supra, federal courts have declined to lift the
stay where parallel litigation or SEC or DOJ investigations have re-
vealed that plaintiffs' claims may be meritorious. These courts have
rejected the argument that the PSLRA's policy goal of preventing
257. See Choi, supra note 223, at 623 (concluding that PSLRA has operated to reduce
incidence of both nuisance litigation and meritorious litigation).
258. See Colin T. Reardon, Note, Pleading in the Information Age, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2170,
2208 (2010) ("While critics of Twombly and Iqbal have rightly noted that certain types of cases
will be disproportionately impacted by the plausibility standard because of information
asymmetries, they have ignored how much information plaintiffs do have access to because
of modern technological advances and the rise of informational regulation.").
259. Richard A. Epstein, Of Pleading and Discovery: Reflections on Twombly and Iqbal with
Special Reference to Antitrust, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 187, 202 (2011). Similarly, in Starr v. Sony
BMG Music Entm't, 592 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2010), the Second Circuit reinstated plaintiffs'
price-fixing Sherman Act claim. Professor Epstein noted: "What was clear was the amount of
public evidence that could be arrayed against the defendants prior to discovery." Epstein,
supra, at 202.
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plaintiffs from filing frivolous strike suits would not be thwarted
under such circumstances.2 o
If an e-discovery stay is extended to all civil litigation, but courts
acknowledge that the stay should be lifted where parallel litigation
or investigations reveal that plaintiffs' claims may have merit, the
danger that access to the courts will be blocked can be minimized.
Private antitrust litigation is instructive. Historically, such litigation
has often been sparked by government investigations and prosecu-
tions. By the time private litigation commences, counsel for
defendants have often already produced documents to govern-
ment investigators and retained electronic copies for themselves.
There is no significant cost to defendants to provide additional
copies to plaintiffs in the parallel litigation. Accordingly, stays
should be lifted in these cases if the documents suggest that plain-
tiffs' claims have merit.2 6 1
Third, given the absence of empirical evidence establishing that
Twombly and Iqbal have resulted in a significant increase in the dis-
missal of meritorious claims, there is little reason to assume that an
e-discovery stay will add more significantly to such dismissals. A
memorandum prepared in October 2009 for the Advisory Commit-
tee on Civil Rules noted: "[I]t is difficult to determine from case
law whether meritorious claims are being screened under the Iqbal
framework or whether the new framework is effectively working to
sift out only those claims that lack merit earlier in the proceed-
ings."' 2 If a modest increase in dismissals of meritorious cases does
result from a mandatory stay of discovery, this is likely to be signifi-
cantly outweighed by the benefits that will flow from such a stay.
260. See, e.g., Brigham v. Royal Bank of Canada, No. 08 CV 4431(WHP), 2009 WL
935684, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2009) (" [T]he mere fact that the PSLRA's goals would not be
frustrated ... is not sufficient to warrant lifting the stay.") (quoting 380544 Canada, Inc. v.
Aspen Tech., Inc., 07 CIV. 1204(JFK), 2007 WL 2049738 (S.D.N.Y.July 18, 2007)).
261. But see In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., No. C 06-07417 WHA, MDL
No. 1826, 2007 AIL 2127577, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2007) (granting defendants' motion to
stay discovery in post-Twombly antitrust multi-district litigation even where the requested
documents had already been produced to DOJ).
262. See Memorandum from Samuel F. Abernathy, Chair, Special Comm. on Pleading
Standards in Fed. Litigation, to the Executive Comm. & House of Delegates of the N.Y. State
Bar Ass'n, Report of the Special Committee on Pleading Standards in Federal Litigation 3
(June 2, 2010) (quoting Oct. 2, 2009 version of Kuperman Memorandum, supra note
251), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu42/Junel92010Houseof
DelegatesMeetingAgendaltems/StandardsforPleadingReportMemo.pdf; see also A. Benjamin
Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 24 (2009) ("[I] t is unknowa-




Unless a discretionary stay is imposed, the FRCP allows discovery
to proceed while motions to dismiss are pending. This allows plain-
tiffs with non-meritorious cases to compel defendants to incur
massive discovery expenses before federal district courts rule on
motions to dismiss. Much of this expense stems from the need to
engage in electronic discovery, which dominates discovery in mod-
ern litigation. The overall effect is that plaintiffs with non-
meritorious cases are able to extract extortionate settlements from
defendants unwilling to incur the front-loaded cost of electronic
discovery. In an effort to address e-discovery issues, the FRCP and
FRE were amended in 2006 and 2008. That effort has failed: costs
have not been reduced to a significant degree and the timing of
discovery has not been addressed. The most effective solution to
the problem of electronic discovery during the pendency of mo-
tions to dismiss is a mandatory stay of such discovery. Pursuant to
the PSLRA, since 1995 there has been a mandatory stay of all dis-
covery during the pendency of motions to dismiss in actions
alleging violations of the securities laws, absent application of one
of two statutory exceptions. That stay, which has largely accom-
plished its primary goals in securities litigation, should be
extended to e-discovery in all federal civil litigation, with the same
exceptions. Application of a mandatory stay of e-discovery prior to
the disposition of motions to dismiss is the most equitable and. ef-
fective solution to the ongoing problem of coercive settlements
stemming from prohibitive discovery expense.
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